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I. INTRODUCTION
Preventing, detecting, and stopping sexual abuse of children is a na-
tional concern. Reports of child abuse have steadily increased in re-
cent years. In 1980, an estimated 351,100 children were abused,' and
this number grew to an estimated 507,700 children in 1986.2 Of these,
119,200 children were sexually abused nationwide.3 In Minnesota
alone, there were 1,312 substantiated cases of sexual abuse by parents
and caretakers in 1990. 4
1. NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECr, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., STUDY FINDINGS: NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 18 tbl. 4-1 (1981). This total only includes abuse by a parent
or caretaker. Id. at 4; DEBRA WHITCOMB, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A
CHILD 1 (2d ed. 1992).
2. ANDREA J. SEDLAK, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TECHNICAL
AMENDMENT TO STUDY FINDINGS-NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: 1988, at 3 (1990).
Even more startling, 1,110 children died as a result of abuse in 1986. Id.
There is some question as to whether abuse has actually increased or whether in-
creased public awareness has caused more cases to be reported. NATIONAL CTR. ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY- STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
1988, at 7 (1988). The increase may also be attributed to new mandatory reporting laws
and an increased number of mandatory reporters. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (Supp. IV
1992); MINN. STAT § 626.556 (1992 & Supp. 1993). Whatever the cause of the increase,
a greater number of children are entering the judicial system.
3. SEDLAK, supra note 2, at 3.
4. NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM: WORKING PAPER 1,
1990 SUMMARY DATA COMPONENT 13 (1992).
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As a result of the increase in reported abuse cases, more children are
participating in the criminal justice system as witnesses. Many states
have enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the possibility of
being traumatized by their participation in the criminal justice system.5
These statutes, however; are not without opposition. Those who advo-
cate for protection of child witnesses and those who advocate for pro-
tection of defendants' rights are locked in ongoing debate.
6
The Minnesota legislature acted to protect child witnesses by passing
a number of statutes that address the special evidentiary issues involved
in sexual abuse cases. 7 However, as both the case law and the under-
standing of these evidentiary problems expanded, the urgent need for
some of these statutes significantly decreased. Minnesota Statutes Sec-
tion 595.02, subdivision 3 (the Minnesota child hearsay statute) is one
example of a statute that, though necessary and beneficial at the time
of enactment, currently serves only to complicate the evidentiary
problems inherent in child sexual abuse cases.
This Comment examines the hearsay problems that arise in cases
where children have been sexually abused, focusing specifically on
Substantiated cases of abuse are those where abuse was positively found to have
occurred. In contrast, unsubstantiated cases include those cases where abuse either
could not be positively ruled out or could not be positively found to have occurred. Id.
at 69.
5. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (Supp. IV 1992); MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4
(1992). Some states have addressed the problem by enacting statutes which provide for
the admission of videotaped testimony. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1994); IowA CODE 910A.14(2)(1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.675-491.705 (Supp.
1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-19216 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988 &
Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993). Some states address
the matter by enacting statutes which provide for testimony via closed circuit television.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE § 910A.14(1) (1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2163a (Supp. 1993); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. §§ 65.00 to .30 (McKinney 1992); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.3511,
2907.41, 2937.11 (Page 1993); TEX. CIaM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Supp. 1994).
6. See, e.g., State v. Kraushaar, 459 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1991). In Kraushaar, the court stated, "[w]e recognize
that whenever allegations of child sexual abuse are made, the system is confronted with
a dilemma: on the one side is a child who must be protected; on the other side stands
the accused, entitled to due process, who must not be unfairly convicted." Id. at 353.
7. For example, the Minnesota legislature recently revised the closed circuit televi-
sion statute. Prior to revision, the statute allowed the child to testify via closed circuit
television, but required that the defendant be able to see and hear the testimony in
person or by a two-way video monitor. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 4 (1990). This stat-
ute was of little value given that the purpose of closed circuit television is to protect the
child from the trauma and intimidation of testifying in the presence of the accused. See
generally Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). The statute was changed to allow the
child to testify in a separate room, while the defendant and the jury observe the testi-
mony from the courtroom. Crimes-Sex Offenders, Victims, Penalties-General
Amendments, H.F. No. 1849 § 595.02, subd. 4 (1992).
1994]
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Minnesota's child hearsay statute. Part II briefly addresses the effects
abuse has upon both the child and the child's testimony. Part III ex-
amines the interaction between the child hearsay statute and the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant. The development and
requirements of the statute are the focus of Part IV. Parts V through
VII present an analysis of the cases8 interpreting the child hearsay
statute.
The remainder of this Comment suggests a new approach to admit-
ting children's out-of-court statements as substantive evidence. Parts
VIII and IX examine the traditional hearsay exceptions, suggesting sit-
uations in which the exceptions apply, and addressing some of the
challenges to the use of these exceptions. Part X advocates that the
time for change has come. Finally, Part XI proposes a new rule of
evidence-Rule 803(25)-to alleviate many of the recurring issues
that arise when children's out-of-court statements are offered as
evidence.
II. THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL ABUSE
The prosecution of child sexual abuse cases does not occur in a vac-
uum. The dynamics of these cases are not present in any other type of
prosecution. First, the abuse often has had a devastating impact on the
child victim and the child's family.9 Second, the victim is often very
young and incapable of understanding the adversarial philosophy and
procedures of the courtroom. 10 More significant, because the system
of court rules and procedures was designed by adults for adult partici-
pants,I it is largely antagonistic to child victims and witnesses.1 2 All of
8. Several unpublished decisions are used for purposes of discussion. MINN. STAT.
§ 480A.08, subd. 3(b)(1992) provides that "[t he decision of the court need not include
a written opinion. A statement of the decision without a written opinion must not be
officially published and must not be cited as precedent, except as law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel." Unpublished opinions are used only for the purpose
of demonstrating how courts are currently interpreting the statute. Although the need
for a revised statute is apparent without these decisions, the use of these decisions rein-
forces this argument.
9. JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 135-36 (Jon R.
Conte ed. 1992) [hereinafter MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES].
10. Researchers have found that children had "negative feelings about talking to
the defense attorney and facing the defendant. They had mixed feelings about the
judge, felt positively about the prosecutor, and wanted their (nonoffending) parent
with them." WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 29.
11. John C. Yuille, The Systematic Assessment of Children's Testimony, 29 CAN. PSYCHOL.
247, 247 (1988).
12. One attorney summarized this antagonism best when he said, "[c ] hild victims of
crime are specially handicapped. First, the criminal justice system distrusts them and
puts special barriers in the path of prosecuting their claims to justice. Second, the
criminal justice system seems indifferent to the legitimate special needs that arise from
[Vol. 20
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these factors combine to present special problems in the prosecution
of child abuse cases.
A. The Impact of Testifying on the Child
Sexually abused children suffer serious and sometimes life-long emo-
tional consequences. The common effects of abuse can include a com-
bination of fear for personal safety and the safety of loved ones,
depression, anxiety, embarrassment, nightmares, guilt, ambivalence,
self-hatred, and aggressive or sexually acting-out behavior.13 The im-
pact of abuse ultimately depends on "the age of the child, his or her
relative maturity, the relationship between child and offender.... and
the response of the legal and social services systems."' 4 Given time,
and perhaps professional help, many of the psychological scars left by
sexual abuse can heal. 15
Unfortunately, most children have not had the time or the necessary
help to work though this trauma by the time of trial. As a result, most
sexually abused children do not enter the courtroom as well-adjusted,
normal children, and testifying may result in one of two consequences.
Some mental health researchers fear that the very system that was
designed to protect children may in fact exacerbate some children's
preexisting trauma, resulting in what is sometimes referred to as "sys-
tem induced trauma."16 Victims of child sexual abuse may feel that
they are on trial, which may reinforce the feelings of guilt, self-blame,
their participation." WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting D. Lloyd, Testimony
before the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report 51 (Dec. 1982)).
13. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 5-6, Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478) [hereinafter Brief ofAPA]; Beth Bjerregaard,
Televised Testimony as an Alternative in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 164, 170
(1989); V. Kay Curtis, Criminal Procedure: Closed-Circuit Testimony of Child Victims, 40
OKLA. L. REV. 69, 72 (1987); Jennifer McLaren & Richard E. Brown, Childhood Problems
Associated with Abuse and Neglect, 37 CAN. MENTAL HEALTH 1, 4 (1989).
For an excellent discussion of the development of understanding of the psycholog-
ical impact of sexual abuse see John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 52-62 (1989) [hereinafter Myers, Expert Testimony].
14. Edward J. Saunders, The Child Sexual Abuse Case: A Short Course for Judges,
JUDGES' J., Winter (1988), at 20, 23.
15. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 9, at 124 (quotingJOHN E.B. MYERS, THE AM.
PROFESSIONAL SOC'Y ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN, GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL EVALUA-
TION OF SUSPECTED SEXUAL ABUSE IN YOUNG CHILDREN (1990)).
16. Paul S. Applebaum, Protecting Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 13, 13 (1989). One research project reported that a group of
abused children who went through the court system manifested symptoms of "greater
depression, anxiety, and psychosomatic symptoms" than did children who did not tes-
tify. Brief of APA, supra note 13, at 9. See also DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., OFFICE OFJUV.
JUST. AND DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. CHILD VIC-
TIM As WITNESS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 7 (1991) [hereinafter WHIT-
COMB, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. Whitcomb's preliminary research findings, from a four-
county jurisdiction study which includes Ramsey County, Minnesota, indicates that re-
19941
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and depression that they may already feel. In contrast, other research-
ers believe that testifying may empower the child 17 by giving the child a
sense of control and power that was absent during the abuse.I8 The
impact of testifying ultimately depends on the combined response of
the child's support network and the response of those in the criminal
justice system itself.19
B. The Impact of "System Induced Trauma" on the Child's Testimony
"System induced trauma" may not only affect the child but may also
distort the child's testimony. The trauma can potentially "damage the
reliability, quality, and often the very existence of the child's testi-
mony."20 Once on the witness stand, the child may refuse to explain
what happened, leave out key facts about the abuse, or, in the extreme,
deny that the abuse ever occurred. 2 1 Alternatively, the child's testi-
mony may differ from prior statements, not because of inaccuracy, but
because of stress and trauma.2 2 In addition, the manifestations of "sys-
tem induced trauma" can negatively affect the jury's evaluation of the
peated testifying and long, harsh cross-examination of children over the age of eight
can produce significant adverse effects. Id.
17. Applebaum, supra note 16, at 14; accordJohn F. Tedesco & Steven V. Schnell,
Children's Reactions to Sex Abuse, Investigation, and Litigation, 11 CHILD ABUSE AND NE-
cLECr 267, 268 (1987) (noting that testifying may increase "a child's sense of self-effi-
cacy and can serve as a coping strategy").
18. WHrrCOMB, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 16, at 7.
19. See generally Desmond K. Runyan, The Emotional Impact of Societal Intervention into
Child Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILI) WITNESSES 263-76 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L.
Bottoms eds., 1993).
20. Bjerregaard, supra note 13, at 170.
21. See Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical
View, 85 MICH. L. REv. 809, 820 (1987); Brief of APA, supra note 13, at 18-19.
These factors are not wholly unique to children's testimony. They may also exist in
an adult's testimony. However, given the age of the child, the likelihood of these fac-
tors being present in the child's testimony is greater.
The child's fear of the consequences of telling about the abuse may also cause the
child to deny that the abuse occurred. Research indicates that children may be more
likely to lie depending upon what they perceive as the consequence of lying. Kay Bus-
sey et al., Lies and Secrets: Implications for Children's Reporting of Sexual Abuse, in CHILD
VICTIMS, CHILD WrrNFvsSFs 147, 155-56 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993)
(listing consequences such as fearing getting into trouble, fearing blame for the abuse,
wanting to protect the perpetrator, or being embarrassed). Thus, if the child was
threatened with either personal harm or harm to loved ones, the child may, when
brought face to face with the perpetrator in the courtroom, deny that the abuse oc-
curred to avoid whatever the threatened consequence was. See id. at 161.
22. Gail S. Goodman et al., Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40 J. OF Soc. IssuEs
139, 144 (1984); see also George v. State, 813 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Ark. 1991) (concluding
that the child's slightly contradictory in-court testimony resulted from "[t]he austerity of
the judge, the presence of the [defendant], the tension of her parents, and subtle antag-
onism of defense counsel").
[Vol. 20
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child's truthfulness.23 Justice Blackmun argued that the loss of the
child's effective testimony as a result of "system induced trauma" un-
dermines "the truth finding function of the trial itself."24 If the child is
unable to testify effectively by telling the jury about the abuse, it then
becomes essential to get the child's out-of-court statements admitted as
evidence.
C. A Special Issue in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Availability and
Competency of the Child Victim
The availability and the competency of the child victim to testify are
two factors somewhat unique to child abuse prosecutions. In Minne-
sota, every person "of sufficient understanding" is presumed compe-
tent to testify.25 Minnesota's competency statute specifically states that
children under ten are presumed competent to testify unless the court
finds to the contrary.26 This statutory language may cause an unjusti-
fied focus on the child victim's competency whenever the child is
under ten.27 A child victim will be considered incompetent, and there-
fore unavailable to testify, if the child is unable to remember events
generally, 28 is too young to understand the oath,29 or is unable to ef-
23. Myers, Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 120; Brief of APA, supra note 13, at 13-
14.
24. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. I (Supp. 1993); see State v. Fitzgerald, 382 N.W.2d
892, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986).
26. Minnesota Statutes § 595.02, subd. 1 (m) provides that:
A child under ten years of age is a competent witness unless the court finds
that the child lacks the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts re-
specting which the child is examined. A child describing any act or event may
use language appropriate for a child of that age.
MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1 (m) (Supp. 1993). See State v. Brovold, 477 N.W.2d 775,
778 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that the legislature intended the language of Minn.
Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1 (m) to require a case by case determination of competency), re-
view denied, (Minn. Jan. 17, 1992); see also State v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn.
1993).
Importantly, the trial court has discretion to deny a demand by the defense for a
psychological evaluation of the child to determine competency. State v. Moore, 433
N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
27. In contrast to Minnesota's competency statute, the federal statute does not sin-
gle out any age group as warranting extra care to ensure the child's competency to
testify. Title 18, United States Code § 3509(c) (2) simply states that "a child is presumed
to be competent." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c) (2) (Supp. IV 1992). Moreover, the defendant
cannot compel a competency hearing absent a written motion and an offer of proof of
incompetency. The district court must also establish, "on the record, that compelling
reasons exist." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(3)-(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
28. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently indicated that the trial court can-
not ask specific questions about the child's anticipated testimony. Scott, 501 N.W.2d at
615. Although an inquiry into the child's general capacity to remember is permissible,
an inquiry into the child's memory of the subject matter of the case is not permissible.
1994]
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fectively communicate with the jury.3o Additionally, some courts find
that the child is unavailable to testify if testifying would cause the child
significant emotional trauma.3 1
A finding of incompetency or unavailability should not have any ef-
fect on the trustworthiness and reliability of the child's out-of-court
statements. 3 2 Incompetency and untrustworthiness are not inter-
changeable terms.3 3 The evaluation of the reliability of the out-of-
court statements must be conducted separately from the evaluation of
the child's competency to testify.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c) (8) (Supp. IV 1992); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,
741-42 (1987).
29. The ability to understand the oath requires only the ability to differentiate be-
tween the truth and a falsehood. Research has indicated that four- and five-year-old
children are able to understand the difference. See Bussey et al., supra note 21, at 151.
In fact, one study indicates that not only are four-year-old children able to tell when
someone else lied in a situation but "also when [a] character [in a vignette] was coached
by her mother to lie about a man touching her when he had not done so." Id. This
finding casts some doubt on the argument that children are often coached to lie about
abuse.
30. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1 (m) (Supp. 1993); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d
656, 660 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 (1991); State v. Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42,
45 (Minn. 1984); Moore, 433 N.W.2d at 899; State v. Fitzgerald, 382 N.W.2d 892, 895
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990).
31. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 253, at 446 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144,
148 (Colo. 1990) (finding child unavailable where testifying would cause substantial
and long-term psychological harm); People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 750 (Colo.
1989) (holding that possible harm to child's emotional and psychological well-being
equates unavailability); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (Il. App. Ct. 1989)
(noting unavailability includes children "who are unable to testify due to fear or similar
factors"), appeal denied, 553 N.E.2d 400 (Ill., Apr. 4, 1990); State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250,
1257 (Me. 1987) (holding that possible psychological injury equates unavailability);
State v. Lonergan, 505 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding the child un-
available within the meaning of Rule 804(a) (2) when child entered the courtroom, saw
the defendant, and immediately began crying, begging not to be asked any questions,
and refused to answer any questions put to him).
32. State v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1993); Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 659;
State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Danowit, 497
N.W.2d 636, 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, (Minn. May 11, 1993); see also
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 824. The Wright Court did note that the trial court may
consider unavailability to determine the reliability of the out-of-court statements. Id.
33. See State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that
"[i]ncompetency to testify at trial does not alone render a statement inadmissible"),
review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986); JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT § 7.44 [hereinafter MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE]. But see United States v.
Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1993). In Barrett, the Eighth Circuit indicated
that if the child was incompetent to testify because she was unable to tell the difference
between the truth and a lie, the answers given in the competency hearing would be
admissible for impeachment purposes when other witnesses were called to testify about
the child's out-of-court statements. Id. at 1299.
[Vol. 20
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While the child's unavailability to testify does not necessarily destroy
the child's credibility, it does significantly increase the need for out-of-
court statements. Child sexual abuse is a "secret" crime and one typi-
cally not involving discernible signs of physical violence. Therefore,
the child's statements may be the only evidence of the crime.34 Absent
the admission of these statements as substantive evidence, the chances
of the case going to trial are very slim. This is especially true where
other evidence is lacking. In order for these cases to be brought to
trial, it becomes very important to get out-of-court statements admitted
as substantive evidence.
III. THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
CHILD VICTIM'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS.
Much of the controversy that surrounds sexual abuse prosecutions
stems from the competing interests of the child and the defendant.
On the one hand, the child must be protected from "system induced
trauma." On the other hand, the constitutional rights of the defend-
ant must also be protected. When out-of-court statements are admit-
ted as substantive evidence, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses can be violated.3 5 Out-of-court statements
are generally inadmissible as substantive evidence under the hearsay
rule.36 The exclusion of out-of-court statements results from the de-
34. See State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911,914 (Minn. 1992); Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at
316; see also MYERs, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, at §§ 7.1, 7.42.
35. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Minnesota Constitution also pro-
tects a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
Unlike other Bill of Rights provisions, there is no clear indication of the first Con-
gress's intent in adopting the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. See California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); see also Eleanor L. Owen, The Confrontation Clause
Applied to Minor Victims of Sexual Abuse, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1511, 1515 (1989). The
Supreme Court has generally presumed that its purpose is to prohibit ex parte affidavits.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). See generally Frank M. Tu-
erkheimer, Convictions Through Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: A Logical Progression
Back To Square One, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 47, 47-51 (1988) (providing an historical develop-
ment of the fear of ex parte affidavits).
Judicial interpretation has established three specific protections of the Confronta-
tion Clause: to ensure that the witness testifies under oath; to ensure that the witness is
subject to cross-examination; and to ensure that the jury is permitted to observe the
witness's demeanor. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. See also Michael H. Graham, The Confronta-
tion Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relation-
ship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 593 (1988) (suggesting that another purpose of the
Confrontation Clause is to prevent "flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and
absentee witnesses") (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 179).
36. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
1994]
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fendant's inability to cross-examine the witness and from uncertainty
about the statement's reliability.3 7
The right to confrontation, however, is not absolute and must "occa-
sionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case."38 The prosecution of child abuse is one situation that has
required modification of the traditional confrontation requirements to
enable the prosecution of perpetrators to go forward. 39 The total ex-
clusion of out-of-court statements would undermine the truth-seeking
function of the trial process itself.40
The United States Supreme Court, in Ohio v. Roberts,41 attempted to
strike a balance between the prosecution's need for the statement and
the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation with a two-prong
test to determine whether an out-of-court statement is admissible as
substantive evidence.42 Under the first prong, the statement must be
necessary.43 The necessity prong is satisfied if the proponent of the
statement makes a good-faith effort to produce the declarant or shows
that the declarant is unavailable. 44 Under the second prong, when the
declarant is unavailable to testify, the statement must contain sufficient
"indicia of reliability" so that cross-examination would serve no valua-
asserted." MINN. R. EVID. 801(c). MINN. R. EVID. 802 then provides, "[h]earsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court or by the legislature." MINN. R. EVD. 802.
37. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 n.11. The Court stated, and subsequent courts have
agreed, that cross-examination is the " 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth.'" Id. (quoting 5J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
38. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
39. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990) (admitting the need for
child's out-of-court statements as substantive evidence); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 840 (1990) (allowing a child to testify via closed circuit television).
40. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
41. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
42. Id. at 65.
43. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
44. Id. at 65, 74.
Although the Roberts decision implied that the declarant must be unavailable
before out-of-court statements are admissible, the Court clarified this issue in United
States v. Inad, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). The Inadi Court held that the declarant need not
be unavailable before out-of-court statements are admissible. The necessity require-
ment is limited to those cases where testimony from prior hearings is offered as evi-
dence. Id. at 394. The Court recognized that some out-of-court statements derive their
significance from their context rather than from the content of the statement. Id. at
394-96. See also White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992); McComicxK, supra note 31,
§ 252 at 442 (suggesting that if the hearsay exception does not require unavailability,
the Confrontation Clause will not require availability either). See generally Jennifer L.
Guy, Note, Has Wright Made Right?: The Interaction in Child Sexual Abuse Cases Between the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule Exceptions, 31 U. LoulSvILLEJ.
Fm. L. 535 (1992).
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ble purpose. 45 Reliability is presumed when the statement falls within
one of the firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions.46 If the statement does
not fall within a firmly-rooted exception, there must be a showing of
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" equal to those presumed
to exist in the firmly-rooted exceptions.47
The decision in Roberts recognized the changing needs and the de-
velopment of the judicial process. The Court described the judicial
process as one of "gradual [change], building on past decisions, draw-
ing on new experience, and responding to new conditions."48 This
description accurately describes the reaction of the judicial system to
child sexual abuse prosecutions as the system slowly adapts to the spe-
cial needs of children. 49 The prevalence of the ideas that children
can be easily coached and that children cannot be relied upon to tell
the truth accounts for some of the delay.5 0
As more sexual abuse cases entered the system and the case law
evolved, the courts became more responsive to the needs of children.51
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the
45. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66. The purpose of cross-examination is "to challenge
'whether the declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the truth, whether
the declarant accurately perceived and remembered the matter he related, and
whether the declarant's intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he
employed.'" Id. at 71 (quoting David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-
Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REv.
1378, 1378 (1972)).
46. See MINN. R. EvID. 803(2)-(24), 804(b)(1)-(b)(5); see also FED. R. EvD. 803(1)-
(24), 804(b) (1)-(b) (5).
Rules 803 and 804 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence contain the two categories
of hearsay exceptions. Rule 803 applies whether or not the declarant is unavailable
while Rule 804 requires that the declarant be unavailable. The major difference be-
tween the two categories is the focus on the declarant's availability to testify. This differ-
ence, however, appears only to have historical significance. MINN. R. EVID. 803
committee comment; see also McCoRmicK, supra note 31, § 253, at 444.
Rule 803(2) through 803(23) are considered "firmly-rooted" exceptions because
these rules represent the codification of a long-standing common law tradition of ad-
mitting certain types of out-of-court statements into evidence over hearsay objections.
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990); State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 343
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993); see also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 803, at 830 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that "Rule 803 includes those hearsay statements
which have been considered so truthworthy as to be admissible without requiring impo-
sition of the time and expense associated with production of a declarant if available or
in spite of the fact that the declarant of the statement actually testifies at trial.")
47. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
48. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
49. See generally Yuille, supra note 11, at 247.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1985) (permitting use of ana-
tomically correct dolls as demonstrative evidence in child abuse cases); Sheryl K. Essen-
burg, Accommodating Child Victims in the Criminal Courtroom, 78 ILL. B.J. 248
(1990) (relaying instance where six-year-old boy was permitted to testify while sitting on
his father's lap); State v. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 1989) (permitting placement
19941
11
Zehnder: A Step Forward: Rule 803(25), a New Approach to Child Hearsay Sta
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
prosecution of crimes against children is an important societal inter-
est5 2 that requires certain modifications to standard procedures.53
Among these modifications were new standards recognizing that chil-
dren's out-of-court statements are vital to the successful prosecution of
child abuse.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINNESOTA CHILD HEARSAY STATUTE
One of the most difficult evidentiary problems in the prosecution of
child sexual abuse cases is the possibility that the child victim's out-of-
court statements will be deemed inadmissible. The child victim's testi-
mony is generally the most crucial and valuable piece of evidence.
5 4
The child and the perpetrator are usually the only persons involved, so
the child's statements may be the only evidence against the perpetra-
tor.55 Unfortunately, the child victim may not be able to testify at all,
or if the child is able to testify, the child may be unable to testify effec-
tively.56 In these cases, it is essential to the successful prosecution of
the case that the child's out-of-court statements be admitted into evi-
dence. 5 7 Even if the child does testify, out-of-court statements are use-
of one-way mirror between defendant and step-daughter while step-daughter testified in
sexual abuse case), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 875 (1989).
52. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990), the Court recognized the state's
interest in protecting children from the trauma that could result from testifying. In
particular, the Court noted that testifying in the adversarial environment of the court-
room can have a significant and negative impact upon the child's psychological well-
being. Id. at 852-57. The Court held that it would not second-guess the judgment un-
derlying the state's measures to protect children from harm, provided the state makes
an adequate showing of necessity for the means it chooses to protect children from
harm. Id. at 856-57.
53. Id. at 852.
54. The victim's testimony alone is sufficient to support a sexual assault conviction.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subd. 1 (1992).
55. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1986). The Court recognized that
"[c]hild abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part
because there are often no witnesses except the victim." Id. at 60. See also State v.
Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. 1988); WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 22.
56. This group of child witnesses includes those children who get on the stand and
freeze and those children who can answer preliminary, nonthreatening questions but
freeze when the abuse itself is discussed.
57. See State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn. 1992) (noting that exclusion
of the unavailable child's statements "significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful
prosecution") (quoting State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn. 1987));
accord United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986) (noting that there is no better
version of the evidence than out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable);
see also Graham, supra note 35, at 578 n.301 (reporting that children's statements may
be the only probative evidence available when the child retracts earlier statements, is
unable to recall the abuse, or is too young to testify);John C. Koski, Idaho v. Wright: The
Defenestration of Corroborating Evidence, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 205, 214 (1991) (stating
"[n]owhere is the need for out-of-court statements greater than in child abuse litiga-
tion") (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae American Professional Society on the Abuse of
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ful to demonstrate the child's spontaneity, affect, and initial use of
child-like vocabulary.58
Cognizant of both the difficulties of sexual abuse prosecutions and
the Roberts two-prong test, many legislatures enacted statutes that spe-
cifically allow children's out-of-court statements to be admitted as sub-
stantive evidence.59 These statutes responded to the apparent
reluctance of the courts to admit a child victim's out-of-court state-
ments and the resulting difficulty in prosecuting child sexual abuse
cases. In 1984, Minnesota enacted its statute, modeled after several
existing child hearsay statutes.60
Children, American Academy of Pediatrics, American Medical Association, National Or-
ganization for Women, National Association of Counsel for Children, State of Rhode
Island Office of the Child Advocate, and Support Center for Child Advocates at 5,
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260)).
58. See State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 814-15 (Ariz. 1987). This statement does
not imply, however, that later statements or testimony are unreliable. If the child is
subject to repeated questioning, answers may become very similar and sound rehearsed.
See also State v. Blohm, 281 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1979). In Blohm, the child's out-of-court
statements were admitted as prior consistent statements. Id. at 652. Accord State v.
Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Mo. 1988) (suggesting that out-of-court statements are more
reliable than in-court statements because of trauma and influence prior to trial); WHIT-
COMB, supra note 1, at 18. The child's true emotional response to the abuse may also be
deadened as a result of answering repeated questions about the incident.
59. SeeALA. CODE §§ 15-25-31 to-37 (1982 & Supp. 1993); ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110
(1962 & Supp. 1993) (grand jury proceedings); Ajuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989)
(unconstitutional Robinson, 735 P.2d at 808); ARK. R. EvmD. 803(25)(A) (1993); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1987 & Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(1) (1991); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-411(1), (3)
(1986 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.803(23) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (Michie Supp. 1993) (permits testimony
of person to whom child's statement was made); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1987 & Supp.
1993); 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. art. 5, § 115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); INn. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1994); KAu. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983 & Supp. 1993);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81 (West Supp.
1993); MICH. R. EVID. 803A (1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-403 (Supp. 1993) (unconsti-
tutional Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1347-48 (Miss. 1989); Miss. R. EVID. 803(25)
(1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.075 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. 51.385 (1991); N.J. R. EVID.
63(33) (1993); N.D. R. EvD. 803(24) (1992); OHIO R. EVID. 807 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 2803.1 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.460 (1993 & Supp. 1993); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-28
(1987 & Supp. 1993); TEX. CODE CRUM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (West 1979 & Supp.
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1990 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.13:2 (Michie Supp. 1993); VT. R. EVID. 804a (1993); VT. R. CRIM. PROC. 26(d)
(1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1992). List compiled in part by the Na-
tional Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse.
60. 1984 Minn. Laws ch. 588, § 4. The language of Minnesota's child hearsay stat-
ute is virtually identical to Washington's 1983 Revised Code Annotated § 9A.44.120,
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The Minnesota child hearsay statute has four main requirements for
admissibility.61 First, the out-of-court statement must be one which is
not admissible under any other statute or rule of evidence.62 Second,
the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the reliability of the
statement.63 Third, if the child is available and testifies, the statement
is admissible; or in the alternative, if the child is unavailable to testify,
there must be corroborative evidence of the act.64 Finally, the prose-
cution must give sufficient notice to the defendant of its intent to use
the statement.
65
The second and third requirements of the child hearsay statute mir-
ror the Roberts two-prong test. The statute's second requirement, indi-
cia of reliability, satisfies the trustworthiness prong of the Roberts test.6 6
There must be an analysis of the statement's reliability when it is of-
61. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1992). The statute provides:
[a] n out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years or a
person who is mentally impaired as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 6,
alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual contact or pene-
tration performed with or on the child or any act of physical abuse of the child
or the person who is mentally impaired by another, not otherwise admissible
by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible as substantive evidence if:
(a) the court or person authorized to receive evidence finds, in a
hearing conducted outside of the presence of the jury, that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the
person to whom the statement is made provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(b) the child or person mentally impaired as defined in section
609.341, subdivision 6, either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative
evidence of the act; and
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding at which
the proponent intends to offer the statement into evidence to pro-
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
For purposes of this subdivision, an out-of-court statement includes video,




63. Id. § 595.02, subd. 3(a).
64. Id. § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(i), (ii). But see TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072
(West 1985) (providing that the statute only applies when the child is available to tes-
tify); contra Ax. CODE § 15-25-31(2) (b) (1989) (providing that if the child is unavaila-
ble, the statement need only contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness); VT.
R. EVD. 804a (1992) (providing that the statute only applies when the child is available
to testify).
For discussion on the unavailability of a child to testify, see supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
65. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(c) (1992).
66. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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fered under the child hearsay statute because the statute is not a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception. 67 The third requirement of the statute re-
flects the necessity prong of the Roberts test.68 If the child victim is
available to testify, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated because
the child will testify under oath and will be subject to cross-examina-
tion by the defendant. 69 If the child is unavailable, the necessity prong
of Roberts is fulfilled because the child's out-of-court statements and,
possibly, physical evidence are generally the only available evidence.
7 0
V. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA CHILD HEARSAY STATUTE
PRIOR TO IDAHO V. WRMGIT-I-
The initial cases interpreting the child hearsay statute focused pri-
marily on three of the statute's requirements and appeared to ignore
the fourth.7 1 The discussion in appellate court decisions focused on
the determination of which factors indicated that the statement was
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the requirements of the statute and the
test enunciated in Roberts.72 The courts summarily discussed the fac-
67. See State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (accepting
the Eighth Circuit's determination that MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3, is not a firmly-
rooted hearsay exception).
68. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
69. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970). The Confrontation Clause is
inherently satisfied when the declarant testifies under oath while admitting or denying
the statement, is subject to cross-examination, and the jury is able to consider and ob-
serve the declarant's demeanor. Id. at 158-59; see also United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d
601, 609 n.9 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); State v. Bellotti, 383
N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986).
70. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 314.
In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in White v. Illinois, 112
S. Ct. 736 (1992), it is questionable whether a finding of unavailability is still required.
White involved a conviction for sexual abuse of a four-year-old girl. The victim was un-
able to testify and the trial court admitted the child's statements as spontaneous decla-
rations and as statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis. Id. at 740. The
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the declarant must be unavailable before
the statements are admissible. It stated that the "unavailability rule would ... do little
to improve the accuracy of fact finding .... " Id. at 742. See also Ring v. Erickson, 983
F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that whether the minor was unavailable is irrele-
vant for purposes of the confrontation clause); Myrna S. Raeder, White's Effect on the
Right to Confront One's Accusers, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1993, at 4-5 (questioning why the
Wright court asked whether a showing of unavailability is required if the answer is always
"no").
71. See, e.g., State v. Dana, 422 N.W.2d 246, 248-50 (Minn. 1988), habeas corpus de-
nied, 958 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3043 (1992); State v. Burns, 394
N.W.2d 495, 496-99 (Minn. 1986); Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 312-14.
72. The appellate courts gave primary attention to determining whether the hear-
ing held by the trial court was adequate. Generally, the trial court's failure to hold a
hearing to determine the statement's reliability was not reversible error. Acknowledg-
ing that the purpose of the hearing was to keep unreliable evidence from the jury, the
appellate courts found the failure to hold a hearing harmless if the statement contained
19941
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tors used to find corroboration.7T These factors overlapped with the
factors used to establish reliability. The early court opinions also ex-
panded the class of declarants to which the statute applied.7 4 These
early decisions suggest that, even at the statute's inception, the explicit
requirements of the statute were not going to be followed in their
entirety.
The appellate courts primarily focused on whether the child's out-of-
court statement contained sufficient indicia of reliability. Trial courts
considered a variety of factors to determine whether the statements
were sufficiently reliable: the spontaneity of the statement, 75 the use of
leading or suggestive questions, 76 the motive of the child or recipient
of the statement to fabricate the abuse,77 the fact that the statement is
inconsistent with the type of knowledge expected at the child's age, 78
the time between the report and the alleged incident,79 the defend-
ant's opportunity to commit the crime,8 0 the child's fear of the defend-
ant,8 1 the results of the judge's examination of the child's reliability
sufficient indicia of reliability. Dana, 422 N.W.2d at 249. It was sufficient that the relia-
bility of the statement was evident from the record. Burns, 394 N.W.2d at 497-98. The
appellate courts also rejected arguments that there had to be testimony about the cir-
cumstances surrounding each statement before a determination of reliability could be
made. Dana, 433 N.W.2d at 249. The reliability determination can be made on the
arguments and submissions of the parties alone. Id. Although the statute specifically
requires that a hearing be held to determine reliability, MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd.
3 (a) (1992), it was very clear from the initial interpretations of the statute that the court
would modify and change the statutory requirements. See Dana, 422 N.W.2d at 249;
Burns, 394 N.W.2d at 497-98.
73. See, e.g., State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn. 1988); State v. Ring, No.
C1-89-1038, 1990 WL 462, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1990), habeas corpus granted sub
nom Ring v. Erickson, 968 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1992), opinion vacated and superseded, 983
F.2d 818 (1992); State v. Biermaier, No. CO-88-2364, 1989 WL 72223, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 3, 1989); State v. Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
74. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
75. State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 24, 1986); accord State v. Struss, 404 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding spontaneous revelation of abuse where the victim was reluctant to stay with the
defendant one week after the alleged incident and where the victim's behavior deterio-
rated), review denied, (Minn. June 9, 1987).
76. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 313; State v. Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986); see also Struss, 404 N.W.2d at 816 (rejecting the argument that the initial use of
leading questions indicated unreliability when the victim then freely discussed the
matter).
77. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 276; Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 313.
78. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 313.
79. Id. at 313; Carver, 380 N.W.2d at 826.
80. State v. Bellotti, '383 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn.
Apr. 24, 1986).
81. See State v. Struss, 404 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), review denied,
(Minn. June 9, 1987).
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immediately before trial,8 2 and the existence of corroboration of the
abuse such as the child's fear of speaking to men.83 Many of the appel-
late decisions, however, summarily found sufficient indicia of reliability
without articulating the factors on which the trial courts relied.8 4
When reviewing findings of reliability, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
found several additional factors: consistent repetition,85 deterioration
in the victim's behavior,86 and whether the child agreed with every-
thing the interviewer asked.87 As this extensive list of factors indicates,
the courts examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
statement to evaluate reliability.
The child hearsay statute requires, in addition to factors indicating
reliability, that there be corroborative evidence of the act of abuse
when the child is unavailable to testify.8 8 The appellate courts have
found corroborative evidence where there was a partial confession,8 9
where there was testimony from other children who witnessed the
abuse or who were themselves victims of the same perpetrator, 90 where
the child's behavior changed following the alleged incident,91 where
the defendant was present in the home at the time of the incident,9 2
and where the child exhibited a fearful or upset demeanor when mak-
ing the statement.9 3 As this list indicates, there is a significant overlap
between the factors used to find reliability and those used to find
corroboration.
The Minnesota child hearsay statute explicitly provides that its appli-
cation is limited to those statements that are inadmissible under any
other rule of evidence.9 4 Contrary to this explicit statutory language,
82. State v. Ring, No. C1-89-1038, 1990 WL 462, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 9, 1990),
habeas corpus granted sub nom Ring v. Erickson, 968 F.2d 760 (8th Cir.), opinion amended
and superseded, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
83. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 313.
84. Ring, 1990 WL 462, at *2; State v. Biermaier, No. C0-88-2364, 1989 WL 72223,
at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 1989); State v. Ronnebaum, 446 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 449 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1990).
85. Struss, 404 N.W.2d at 816; State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986); State v. Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
86. State v. Struss, 404 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn.
June 9, 1987).
87. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 313.
88. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(ii) (1992).
89. Bellott, 383 N.W.2d at 314.
90. State v. Ring, No. C1-89-1038, 1990 WL 462, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 9, 1990),
habeas corpus granted sub nom Ring v. Erickson, 968 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1992), opinion
amended and superseded, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1992); Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 314.
91. State v. Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing M.N.D. v.
B.M.D., 356 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
92. Ring, 1990 WL 462, at *2.
93. Id.
94. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1992).
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at least two courts first applied the child hearsay statute and, upon
finding it inapplicable, turned to the other rules of evidence. 95 The
application of the statute where other rules of evidence should have
been applied demonstrates the state of confusion about the statute's
purpose and indicates a need for clarification.
Curiously, the courts also have interpreted the child hearsay statute
to apply to statements made by children who are not describing their
own abuse. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute per-
mits the admission of out-of-court statements made by children who
witnessed the complainant's abuse, provided the witness was simultane-
ously abused by the perpetrator. 96 This interpretation is puzzling in
light of explicit statutory language limiting the statute's application to
statements that are "alleging, explaining, denying, or describing" any
abuse of that child.97 The court was apparently willing to stretch the
interpretation of a very explicit statutory requirement to reach a just
result.
The child hearsay statute does not require that the child's out-of-
court statement be made to any particular person before the statute
will apply.98 Accordingly, no judicial restraints were imposed.99 State-
ments made to doctors,0 parents and foster parents, 101 police of-
95. State v. Dana, 422 N.W.2d 246, 250 n.2 (Minn. 1988), habeas corpus denied; 958
F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 693 (1991); State v. Smith, 384 N.W.2d
546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. May 29, 1986); see also State v.
Biermaier, No. C0-88-2364, 1989 WL 72223, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.July 3, 1989) (confus-
ing the requirements of the statute with those of the rules of evidence).
96. Dana, 422 N.W.2d at 250. This decision overrules an earlier Court of Appeals
decision holding that the statute is applicable only to statements made by the complain-
ant. State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Although the court
in Bellotti held that this use of the statute was in error, the admission of the statement
was upheld under Rule 803(24) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Id.
The Court of Appeals later extended the holding in Dana to include situations in
which the testifying child was an earlier victim of the defendant. State v. Voelker, No.
C8-90-412, 1990 WL 204269, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990). But see FLA. STAT. ch.
90.803(23) (1993) (providing specifically for the admission of statements by children
who observed the abuse).
97. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1992).
98. Contra MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-103.1 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (al-
lowing only statements made to licensed physicians, licensed psychologists, licensed so-
cial workers or teachers to be admissible under the Maryland child hearsay statute).
99. Some commentators suggest that statements made to police officers and social
workers are less likely to be admitted because they are not considered to be sufficiently
reliable. See Graham, supra note 35, at 537.
100. State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Minn. 1989) (dictum); State v. Carver,
380 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1986).
101. See Conklin 444 N.W.2d at 276 (questioning the reliability of foster parents'
statements because their desire to adopt the child provided a motive for fabrication);
Carver, 380 N.W.2d at 825; State v. Biermaier, No. CO-88-2364, 1989 WL 72223, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 1989).
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ficers,102 social workersl0 and psychologistsl04 have all been admitted
under the statute. As long as the child's statement contained sufficient
indicia of reliability and the other statutory requirements were met,
the statement was admitted.
The initial decisions interpreting the child hearsay statute indicate
that the appellate courts were willing to admit children's out-of-court
statements and to use the statute to facilitate the admission of those
statements. Yet, these decisions also suggest that the courts are not
quite as willing to require total compliance with all of the statute's re-
quirements. Instead, the courts seemingly modified the statute's re-
quirements to enable children's statements to be admitted.105 The
courts failed to work with the existing hearsay rules and failed to ex-
pressly exercise their inherent rule-making authority1 06 to address the
troubling aspects of admitting children's out-of-court statements. Min-
nesota courts finally received some guidance from the United States
Supreme Court on how to deal with child victims' out-of-court state-
ments when the Court decided Idaho v. Wright.
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF IDAHO V. WRIGHT
In the 1990 decision of Idaho v. Wright,10 7 the United States Supreme
Court directly addressed the issue of the admissibility of children's out-
of-court statements and signalled a turning point for this area of the
law. The Court clarified a number of issues and provided much
needed guidance on the admission into evidence of children's out-of-
court statements using the existing rules of evidence.
A. The Facts and Lower Court Decisions
Laura Wright and Robert Giles were each convicted of two counts of
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.10S The victims were
Wright's two daughters.109 The abuse was discovered when the older
102. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d at 270; Biermaier, 1989 WL 72223, at *1; State v. Bellotti,
383 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986).
103. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 314.
104. Biermaier, 1989 WL 72223, at *1.
105. This modification of the statute may be an indirect exercise of the Minnesota
Supreme Court's authority to establish the rules of evidence. See infra note 274 and
accompanying text.
106. See also State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn. 1991)(noting that the
separation of powers doctrine requires that the court, not the legislature, has primary
responsibility for adopting rules of evidence); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184
(Minn. 1983) (noting that courts inherently "have the power to establish rules of
evidence").
107. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
108. Id. at 804.
109. The older daughter was five-and-a-half years old, while the younger daughter
was only two-and-a-half years old. Id. at 808.
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daughter told her father's girlfriend that Giles "had sexual intercourse
with her while [Wright] held her down and covered her mouth."11o
Both girls were examined by a pediatrician who had extensive experi-
ence in examining sexual abuse victims."l The trial court found that
the younger daughter, age three at the time of trial, was incapable of
communicating with the jury.11 2 She, therefore, did not testify at
trial. 1 3
The trial court's admission of the younger daughter's statements to
the pediatrician was the subject of Wright's appeal. The doctor testi-
fied about the conversation he had with the younger daughter when
he conducted her physical examination.114 He stated that she re-
sponded affirmatively to questions about vaginal-penile contact be-
tween herself and Giles.' 15 The doctor also indicated that when they
talked about sexual contact, the younger daughter became silent and
did not elaborate upon her answers, whereas in the general conversa-
tion she was very animated and talkative.1 16
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed Wright's conviction for the
abuse of the younger daughter.'1 7 The Idaho court held that the doc-
tor's testimony violated Wright's Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
tion, even though the trial court had properly admitted the statement
110. Id. at 809. Wright and her ex-husband, Louis Wright, had an informal joint
custody agreement for the older daughter. Id.
111. The pediatrician's examination of the younger daughter revealed physical evi-
dence "strongly suggestive of sexual abuse with vaginal contact." Id. The older daugh-
ter's examination also revealed that it was "highly possible that vaginal penetration had
been occurring on a relatively regular basis." State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191, 192 (Idaho
1989).
112. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990).
113. Id.
114. The younger daughter's statements were admitted under Rule 803(24) of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence. Id. at 811-12. This rule is substantially the same as Rule
803(24) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. See infra note 250.
The Court did not address the application of IDAHo R. EV. 803(4), Statements for
Purpose of Medical, Diagnosis or Treatment. The Court also did not analyze whether
the Confrontation Clause requires that the declarant be unavailable. See State v. Lar-
son, 472 N.W.2d 120, 124 n.1 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 965 (1992). The
Wright Court assumed for purposes of its discussion that she was unavailable. Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 816.
115. The Court focused on four specific questions: "Do you play with daddy? Does
daddy play with you? Does daddy touch you with his pee-pee? Do you touch his pee-
pee?" Id. at 810. The younger daughter responded affirmatively to and elaborated on
the first and second questions; she merely responded affirmatively to the third ques-
tion; and she failed to respond to the fourth question. Id. at 810-11. She also volun-
teered, "[D]addy does do this with me, but he does it a lot more with my sister than with
me." Id. at 811. The doctor admitted on cross-examination that his notes were summa-
rized and that he failed to record any specific statements or to note any emotional
change during the examination. Id.
116. Id. at 810-11.
117. Id. at 812 (citing State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224 (Idaho 1989)).
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under the residual hearsay exception.118 The Idaho Supreme Court
concluded that, because of the lack of video recording and the use of
leading questions by an interviewer with a preconceived idea of what
the child should disclose, the out-of-court statements lacked sufficient
indicia of reliability.'19 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision.1 2 0
B. The Analysis
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that a
very thin line exists between the protections of the Confrontation
Clause and the provisions of the hearsay exclusion rules.121 A finding
of inadmissibility based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment will
supersede any finding of admissibility under the rules of evidence.122
In order to be admissible, therefore, the child's out-of-court statement
must satisfy the provisions of both the applicable hearsay exception
and the Confrontation Clause.
The Court further recognized two categories of hearsay exceptions,
those that are firmly-rooted and those that are not.1 2 3 Statements not
falling within a firmly-rooted exception are presumptively unreliable
and inadmissible, unless particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
exist to satisfy the reliability prong of Roberts.l24 The Court held that
Rule 803(24) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is not a firmly-rooted
118. Id. at 812, 816.
Wright and Giles filed separate appeals. State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1225
(Idaho 1989). Wright argued that the doctor's testimony violated her right of confron-
tation, while Giles only argued inadmissibility under Rule 803 (24) of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the statements were properly admit-
ted under the rules of evidence and affirmed Giles conviction. State v. Giles, 772 P.2d
191, 195 (Idaho 1989). In Wright's case, however, the court concluded that the state-
ments lacked the reliability necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1231.
The court did not feel it could address this same issue in Giles' appeal because he did
not raise it. Giles, 772 P.2d at 195 n.3 (Huntley, J., concurring).
It is interesting to note the Idaho court's presumed mutual exclusivity of factors
used for the different admissibility evaluations. In Giles, the court established reliability
based on physical evidence that corroborated the sexual abuse, the absence of a motive
to fabricate, the absence of a custody battle, and the opportunity of the defendant to
commit the crime. Giles, 772 P.2d at 194, 195 n.2. These factors outweighed the doc-
tor's use of leading questions. Id. at 195. In State v. Wright, however, the statements
were held to be constitutionally unreliable because of the doctor's failure to record the
statements on videotape, his use of leading questions, and his preconceived idea of
what the younger daughter would say. 775 P.2d at 1227. With the exception of one
element, the court did not look to any of the same factors to find or deny reliability.
119. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 812-13.
120. Id. at 813.
121. Id. at 814.
122. Id.; see also White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992).
123. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816-17.
124. Id. at 818.
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hearsay exception and that statements offered under it are inadmissi-
ble absent a finding of sufficient indicia of reliability.125 In this case,
the Court found that the younger daughter's statements lacked the
necessary indicia of reliability and that the Idaho Supreme Court had
properly determined that the statements were inadmissible.126
Although the Court agreed with the result reached by the Idaho
Supreme Court, it rejected the lower court's determination of unrelia-
bility based on the lack of procedural safeguards.1 27 It labelled the
reliance on procedural safeguards an "artificial litmus test," unneces-
sary for constitutional purposes.128 The Court acknowledged that
"[o]ut-of-court statements made by children regarding sexual abuse
arise in a wide variety of circumstances" and stated, "we do not believe
the Constitution imposes a fixed set of procedural prerequisites" to a
finding that a statement is admissible.1 29
Rather than focusing on superficial procedural safeguards, the
Court held that trial courts must consider the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the child's out-of-court statement. 130 In looking
at the totality of the circumstances, however, the trial court must ig-
nore corroborative evidence.1 31 The Court derived this conclusion by
examining why statements that meet the requirements of the firmly-
rooted hearsay exceptions are admissible without additional evaluation
of the statement's reliability. The Court specifically focused on the ex-
cited utterance exception,13 2 the dying declaration exception,1 33 and
the medical treatment or diagnosis exception. 3 4 Statements falling
within these exceptions derive their trustworthiness not from outside
corroborative evidence, but rather from the surrounding circum-
stances that indicate the unlikelihood the declarant was lying.1a5 Sub-
sequent cross-examination about these statements at trial "would be of
marginal utility" or superfluous.13 6 To be admissible, therefore, an
125. Id. at 817. The Court described the residual hearsay exception as an ad hoc




128. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
129. Id. at 818.
130. Id. at 819.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 820. SeeFED. R. EVID. 803(2); see also MINN. R. EvID. 803(2). See infra notes
183-211 and accompanying text.
133. Idaho v. Wright 497 U.S. at 820. See FED. R. EV. 804(b) (2); see also MINN. R.
Evm. 804(b) (2).
134. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4); see also MINN. R. EVID.
803(4). See infra notes 212-247 and accompanying text.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss3/7
NEW APPROACH TO CHILD HEARSAY
out-of-court statement must be so inherently truthful that cross-exami-
nation to test its truthfulness would be futile.'3
7
The Court then enumerated some of the factors courts should con-
sider in light of the totality of the circumstances existing at the time the
statement was made.' 3 8 These include spontaneity, consistent repeti-
tion,' 3 9 the mental state of the declarant,140 the child's use of termi-
nology that is inconsistent with the child's age, 14 1 motive to fabricate,
the use of leading questions, 142 and prior questioning of the child.143
137. Id. at 820-21.
138. Id. at 821-22.
139. Care must be exercised when looking at the consistency of the statement. If
the focus is on the internal consistency of an individual statement, this factor relates to
circumstances surrounding the statement and is consistent with the Court's decision.
See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Minn. 1992) (considering the internal
consistency of the statement). If, however, the focus is on the consistency of all of the
child's statements, this is a corroborative factor. The consistency of all the statements
adds corroboration and believability, but it may not add to the internal reliability of the
individual statement.
Aside from looking at the consistency of the statements for reliability purposes,
care must be exercised in evaluating the consistency of all of the child's statements.
Children who have been subjected to repeated abuse may not be able to distinguish
one abuse incident from another or may describe different abuse incidents each time a
statement is made. Myers, Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 88. This does not mean
that the child has been coached or is lying. It simply means that the child has been
abused so frequently that the child is no longer able to distinguish one incident from
another.
Where the child gives apparently inconsistent statements, such as those described
above, attempts must be made to determine whether the child is talking about the same
incident or multiple incidents. This can be accomplished by asking the child
"landmark" questions such as "Was it before or after school?", "Was it dark or light
outside?", "Was it before or after Christmas?", "Was it before or after Mom/Dad came
home from work?", etc. These questions clarify what the child is describing and negate
attempts to argue that a particular statement is not reliable.
140. Emphasis on the child's mental state may be somewhat deceptive. Young chil-
dren may not know that what occurred was wrong, and, consequently, they may not
have a "normal" emotional response when they reveal the abuse. WHITCOMB, supra note
1, at 88. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanford, 580 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). San-
ford noted that the victim's mother, in describing the look on her child's face, stated
that the child did not seem to know whether the sexual contact she was describing was
right or wrong. Id. at 789.
141. This factor has been interpreted to mean that use of age-appropriate language
in describing the abuse is not an indication of reliability. See Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d
818, 821 (8th Cir. 1992). This interpretation ignores the fact that the use of age-appro-
priate language may well undermine allegations of fabrication or coaching, as the child
would be expected to adopt the language used by the adult in these situations.
142. The Court specifically noted that the use of appropriate leading questions does
not necessarily make the statement unreliable. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819
(1990) (citing JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW AND PACTICE, § 4.6, at 129-34
(1987)).
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The Court afforded trial courts considerable discretion to determine
which factors, under the circumstances of the particular case, are rele-
vant to the reliability determination.144 However, corroborative evi-
dence cannot be used in this determination.145 The decision in Idaho
v. Wright has become the cornerstone in analyzing whether a child's
out-of-court statement was properly admitted as substantive evidence.
VII. POST-IDAHO V. WRIGHT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA
CHILD HEARSAY STATUTE: A CHANGE IN Focus
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright
marked a subtle change in the interpretation of Minnesota's child
hearsay statute. Decisions following Idaho v. Wright reveal the construc-
tive, if not the actual, abandonment of the requirement that all four
parts of the child hearsay statute must be satisfied before a statement
can properly be admitted. The appellate courts began to focus only on
the reliability of the child's out-of-court statements. Idaho v. Wright also
left the Minnesota courts in somewhat of a quandary. While Idaho v.
Wright emphatically rejected the use of corroborative evidence to de-
termine admissibility, the Minnesota child hearsay statute requires the
additional factor of corroborative evidence if the child is unavailable to
testify. 146
The post-Idaho v. Wright decisions also reveal that the appellate
courts have confused the requirements of the child hearsay statute
with the requirements of the residual hearsay exceptions.
A. Focus on Reliability
Like the pre-Idaho v. Wright decisions, few post-Idaho v. Wright deci-
sions acknowledged the first requirement of the child hearsay statute:
that the out-of-court statement must first be inadmissible under the
other rules of evidence. 147 It was only recently that the Minnesota
Supreme Court expressly recognized this requirement. The supreme
court acknowledged that, when a statement is admissible under any of
the evidentiary hearsay exceptions, the child hearsay statute should not
be used.1 48 It was not until this express acknowledgement that the
Court of Appeals began, in a few cases, to also acknowledge this re-
144. Id. at 822.
145. Id. The Court also rejected the use of factors such as physical evidence of the
abuse. Id. at 826.
146. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(a), (b)(ii) (1992).
147. Id. § 595.02, subd. 3.
148. State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. 1992) (upholding admission
under Rule 803(24)); State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 126 (Minn. 1991) (upholding
admission under Rule 803(24) instead of MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 965 (1992).
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quirement.149 The majority of the post-Idaho v. Wright cases have sim-
ply ignored the child hearsay statute's requirement that the statement
must not be admissible under any of the rules of evidence and focused
instead on the reliability requirement.
150
Post-Idaho v. Wright decisions were dominated by discussions of
whether the statements contain sufficient indicia of reliability.151 The
factors listed in Idaho v. Wright were primarily used to determine
whether or not the statement contained sufficient indicia of reliability
to meet the second requirement of the statute. 15
2
State v. Lanam1S5 is a clear example of the reliance Minnesota courts
have placed on Idaho v. Wright. In Lanam, a three-year-old child's state-
ments to her foster mother were admitted under the child hearsay stat-
ute. 154 The Lanam court first reviewed the reliability factors which
Minnesota courts had relied on prior to Idaho v. Wright and then ac-
knowledged that some of the factors were in fact corroborative fac-
tors. 15 5 The court then enumerated a revised list of factors Minnesota
courts should consider when determining the reliability of a particular
statement.1 56 The Lanam factors include the spontaneity of the state-
ments, consistent repetition, the use of non-leading questions, the fact
149. Compare Dolny v. State, No. C5-91-23, 1991 WL 109230, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 25, 1991) (acknowledging that the child's statement was admissible under Rule
803(4) but affirming the admission under the child hearsay statute) with State v. Chris-
topherson, 500 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (disregarding the admissibility
issue under the child hearsay statute where the child's extrajudicial statements were
admissible under the rules of evidence). But see State v. Ligon, No. C4-92-2162, 1993
WL 405306, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993), review denied, (Minn. Dec. 14, 1993);
State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 343-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (conducting the
reliability analysis of Rule 803(24) but upholding admissibility under the child hearsay
statute).
150. See, e.g., State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 660-62 (Minn. 1990); State v. Danowit,
497 N.W.2d 636, 638-39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ligon, 1993 WL 405306, at *1-2; State v.
Salazar, No. C9-92-228, 1993 WL 599, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1993); State v. Scott,
No. CO-91-2101, 1992 WL 174665, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.July 28, 1992); Dolny v. State,
1991 WL 109230, at *1; State v. Sybrant, No. C9-90-1908, 1991 WL 102950, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App.June 18, 1991); State v. Lovejoy, No. C8-90-880, 1991 WL 21614 at *2-3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1991); State v. Voelker, No. C8-90-412, 1990 WL 204269, at *1-2
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990).
151. See, e.g., Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 660-62; Dolny, 1991 WL 109230, at *1; Lovejoy,
1991 WL 21614, at *2-3; Voelker, 1990 WL 204269, at *1-2.
152. See MCCORMICK, supra note 31, § 252 at 443. McCormick suggests that courts
will simply begin with the stricter constitutional analysis of Wright rather than first ana-
lyzing the statement under the rules of evidence. Id.
For the factors considered in Idaho v. Wright, see supra notes 139-43 and accompa-
nying text.
153. 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 (1991).
154. Id. at 658.
155. Id. at 659-61. For a review of these factors see supra notes 139-43 and accompa-
nying text.
156. Id. at 661.
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that information provided by the victim was not of the type a child
typically knows,157 the interviewer's preconceived idea of what the
child should reveal, and the lack of a motive by the child or the foster
parent to fabricate the abuse.158 The Lanam factors continue to serve
as guidance for courts to determine the admissibility of out-of-court
statements. 159 Consistent with other post-Idaho v. Wright decisions, the
Lanam decision discussed only the reliability of the statement and
failed to mention any of the other statutory requirements.' 60
In addition to the factors outlined in Idaho v. Wright and Lanam,
Minnesota courts consider several other factors to determine whether
or not a statement is reliable. These include the timing of the report
in relation to the abuse,161 the child's disclosure of any threats made
by the alleged perpetrator,1 62 the possibility that the child was coached
by the alleged perpetrator1 6 3 the amount of description and detail
contained in the statement,164 and the existence of strong corrobora-
157. A recent Minnesota Supreme Court case provides an interesting interpretation
of this factor. State v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1993), involved allegations of digital
penetration of a nine-year-old girl. Id. at 611 n.1. Although Scott involved the admis-
sion of hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 803(24), the reliability factors are the same
as those used for MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3. Id. at 617 (discussing State v. Lanam,
459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990), which involved MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3). The
court found that because the statements made by the victim were not as "lurid" as those
found in previous cases, the statements had less reliability. Id. at 618-19. While the
details a young child can provide are helpful, this decision raises a question of how the
court would react in a fondling case, where the descriptions of the abuse tend not to be
as "lurid."
158. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 661.
159. See, e.g., State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993);
Dolny v. State, No. C5-91-23, 1991 WL 109230, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 1991);
State v. Lovejoy, No. C8-90-880, 1991 WL 21614, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1991);
State v. Lundquist, No. CO-90-419, 1990 WL 188729, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 4,
1990).
160. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 659-61. For other cases ignoring or summarily finding
that the other statutory requirements were met, see Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d at 343-44
(ignoring the other statutory requirements); State v. Scott, No. CO-91-2102, 1992 WL
174665, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 28, 1992) (summarily finding that the other factors
of the statute were met); State v. Graif, No. C4-91-1518, 1992 WL 95876, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. May 12, 1992) (determining the admissibility of the statements based solely on
reliability requirement); Dolny, 1991 WL 109230, at *1 (determining the admissibility of
the statements based solely on reliability).
161. Dolny, 1991 WL 109230, at *1; State v. Voelker, No. C8-90-412, 1990 WL
204269, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990).
162. Wiggins. v. State, No. C2-90-2723, 1991 WL 144757, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug.
6, 1991).
163. State v. Danowit, 497 N.W.2d 636, 639 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
(Minn. May 11, 1993).
164. State v. Sybrant, No. C9-90-1908, 1991 WL 102950, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June
18, 1991), review denied, 472 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1991).
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tive evidence. 165 This range of factors indicates the court's liberal use
of the discretion given in Idaho v. Wright166 to evaluate the reliability of
the statement in light of the special circumstances that surround that
particular statement.
Although Idaho v. Wright advocated the consideration of a variety of
factors to determine reliability,167 the Minnesota courts have differed
as to the number of factors that are necessary to evaluate the reliability
of a particular statement. Some appellate courts have identified only
one or two factors supporting the reliability of the statement, while
others have identified as many as six. 168 The variety in substance and
numbers of factors necessary to establish reliability does not provide
any clear guidance as to which factors are most important or necessary,
although the Idaho v. Wright and Lanam factors were the most fre-
quently considered.' 69
B. The Use of Corroborative Evidence
The third requirement of the child hearsay statute specifically re-
quires corroborative evidence if the child is unavailable to testify. 170
Despite this specificity, only three of eleven decisions involving an in-
competent child witness discussed corroborating evidence.' 7' The cor-
roborative evidence in two of these cases consisted of testimony by
another child who witnessed the act.1 72 The other eight decisions fo-
cused only on the reliability of the statement.' 73 Once those courts
165. State v. Scott, No. CO-91-2102, 1992 WL 174665, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 28,
1992). This factor should not have been relied upon by the court. See supra notes 157-
60 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
168. Compare State v. Salazar, No. C9-92-228, 1993 WL 599, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Jan. 5, 1993) (relying only on the absence of suggestive interview techniques); Scott,
1992 WL 174665, at *2 (relying on strong corroborative evidence and lack of motive to
fabricate) with State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911,916 (Minn. 1992) (relying on a lack of
a preconceived idea of what the child should be saying, lack of motive to fabricate, the
fact that the statement was not the type expected of a child the victim's age, consistent
repetition, and an immediate ring of credibility); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661
(Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033 (1991) (relying on the reliability of the witness
to the statement, spontaneity, lack of leading or suggestive questions, lack of motive to
fabricate, the fact that the statement/terminology was not the type expected of a child
the victim's age, and consistent repetition).
169. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
170. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(b)(ii) (1992).
171. Salazar, 1993 WL 599, at *2; State v. Voelker, No. C8-90-412, 1990 WL 204269,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990); State v. Lynch, No. C9-90-306, 1990 WL 173842, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1990).
172. Voelker, 1990 WL 204269, at *1; Lynch, 1990 WL 173842, at *1.
173. State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033
(1991); State v. Scott, No. CO-91-2102, 1992 WL 174665, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 28,
1992); State v. Graif, No. C4-91-1518, 1992 WL 95876, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12,
1994]
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found sufficient indicia of reliability, they upheld the statement's ad-
missibility, apparently without considering the additional statutory re-
quirement of corroborative evidence.
C. Confusing the Requirements of the Child Hearsay Statute and Residual
Hearsay Exception
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently reviewed the application of
the child hearsay statute in State v. Edwards.174 Edwards involved a pre-
trial appeal of the trial court's finding that the child witness's state-
ments were not reliable. 175 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's decision.1 76 The court also rejected the trial court's
reliance on the child hearsay statute and held that the statements were
admissible under Rule 803(24).177 The court, finding that the require-
1992); Wiggins v. State, No. C2-90-2723, 1991 WL 144757, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 6,
1991); Dolny v. State, No. C5-91-23, 1991 WL 109230, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25,
1991); State v. Fulmer, No. C3-90-1452, 1991 WL 30333, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 12,
1991); State v. Lovejoy, No. C8-90-880, 1991 WL 21614, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 26,
1991); State v. Lundquist, No. CO-90-419, 1990 WL 188729, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
4, 1990).
It is noteworthy that the only case that thoroughly discussed the corroborating
evidence requirement was a divorce case. SeeJirik v. Jirik, No. C5-90-1601, 1991 WL
4040, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 22, 1991).
174. 485 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. 1992).
175. The procedural history of Edwards is illustrative of the confusion and misappli-
cation of the child hearsay statute. The decision discussed in the text is the third pre-
trial appeal of the hearsay issue. The first appeal involved the trial court's general
denial of the admissibility of the victim's statements. State v. Edwards, No. C2-90-2429,
1991 WL 65080, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. April 30, 1991). The court of appeals remanded
the case because it could not determine, based on the record, what the trial court had
relied on to deny the admission of the statement. Id. at *2. The court concluded that,
if lack of notice was the issue, this problem was cured by the time of the appeal. Id.
Further, the court rejected the trial court's use of the child's incompetency to exclude
the statements. Id.
The second appeal again involved the admissibility of the child's out-of-court state-
ments. State v. Edwards, No. C3-91-1171, 1991 WL 271514, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
24, 1991). The court first found that the trial court had not abused its discretion by
refusing to admit some of the statements as excited utterances. It concluded, however,
that the trial court again erroneously relied upon the events at the child's competency
hearing to exclude the statements and again remanded the case. Id. at *3.
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, the court resolved the issue
of admissibility of the statements "rather than remand to the trial court to again give it
the opportunity of deciding the issue according to applicable criteria." Edwards, 485
N.W.2d at 915.
176. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d at 915.
177. Id. See also State v. Christopherson, 500 N.W.2d 794, 797-98 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (rejecting the use of the child hearsay statute and relying instead upon Rule
801(d) (1) (B)). Contra People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1989). The Colo-
rado Supreme Court, when faced with this same issue, relied upon the child hearsay
statute. Id. at 750-51. It held that because of its specificity, the Colorado courts should
rely upon the child hearsay statute to admit statements in sexual abuse cases. Id. at 752.
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ments of Rule 803(24) are similar to those of the child hearsay statute,
properly concluded that the child hearsay statute could not be used
because the statements were admissible under the rules of evidence.1
7 8
The Edwards ruling on the similarity between Rule 803(24) and the
child hearsay statute is only partially correct and it is indicative of the
persistent confusion surrounding the statute. The court failed to rec-
ognize that the child hearsay statute, unlike Rule 803(24), requires
corroboration in addition to reliability when the child is unavaila-
ble.1 79 Although this conclusion of similarity between the child hear-
say statute and Rule 803(24) was incorrect, the Edwards court's
rejection of the child hearsay statute was correct. The corroborative
evidence requirement provides no additional guarantees of trustwor-
thiness to the individual statement. Furthermore, the corroborative ev-
idence requirement directly conflicts with the U.S. Supreme Court's
rejection of corroborative evidence. 18
0
VIII. A PRIMARY MEANS OF ADMISSIBILITY: RULES 803(2), 803(4),
803(24), 804(B) (5) OF THE MINNESOTA RULES OF EVIDENCE
The law on the admissibility of children's out-of-court statements has
changed significantly since the Minnesota child hearsay statute was
first adopted. Minnesota must now decide how to proceed. Previ-
ously, the courts rarely employed the traditional hearsay exceptions to
admit children's out-of-court statements. Now, the courts recognize
that the traditional hearsay exceptions apply in child sexual abuse
cases in the same way that these exceptions apply in any other case.
The court's willingness to apply the traditional hearsay exceptions and
to admit children's out-of-court statements calls into question the con-
tinued need for the child hearsay statute as it currently exists. The
issue of whether or not to admit a child's out-of-court statements would
be more appropriately addressed by utilizing the existing rules of evi-
dence. Furthermore, it would be more appropriate for Minnesota to
adopt an evidentiary rule that deals specifically with the admissibility of
children's out-of-court statements rather than to rely on the current
child hearsay statute.
The remaining sections of this article look at the theories behind
some of the traditional hearsay exceptions and the types of situations
to which they should or should not be applied.
The current confusion and inconsistency in the Colorado case law results from the
differing requirements of the residual hearsay exception and the child hearsay statute.
Id. But see State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (continuing
to rely upon Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3 when Rules 803(4) and 803(24) of the Minne-
sota Rules of Evidence are applicable).
178. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d at 915.
179. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(b) (ii) (1992).
180. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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IX. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MINNESOTA RULES OF EVIDENCE IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES.
Several commentators have expressed a pessimistic view toward the
applicability of the firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions in child sexual
abuse cases.18 1 Because of this pessimistic attitude, many states have
adopted specific child hearsay statutes to combat the hearsay
problems.1 82 However, an analysis of the theories underlying the
firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions and an awareness of the specific cir-
cumstances under which a particular statement was made demon-
strates that these rules are applicable in child abuse cases. Specifically,
Rule 803(2), Excited Utterances; Rule 803(4), Statements for the Pur-
poses of Medical Treatment or Diagnosis; and Rules 803(24) and
804(b) (5), the Residual Exceptions, will be used to demonstrate the
applicability of the traditional rules of evidence.
A. Rule 803(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, Excited Utterances
The first traditional hearsay exception applicable in child sexual
abuse cases is Rule 803(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, the
excited utterance exception.183 The admissibility of statements under
Rule 803(2) depends entirely on the emotional affect of the declarant
at the time the statement was made and on the nature of the event that
181. See, e.g., Anna Frissell & James M. Vukelic, Application of the Hearsay Exceptions
and Constitutional Challenges to the Admission of A Child's Out-of-Court Statements in the Prose-
cution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases in North Dakota, 66 N.D. L. REv. 599 (1990). Frissell and
Vukelic maintain that the excited utterance exception under Federal Rules of Evidence
803(2) does not necessarily apply to children's statements because there is research
indicating that "most children do not view a sexual assault episode as shocking..." Id.
at 620. Furthermore, the delay between the event and the child's statement also calls
into question the applicability of this exception. They ultimately characterize the use of
the excited utterance exception as "stretching." Id. at 621.
See also Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257 (1989). Mostellar maintains that the excep-
tion for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis has been applied by
courts in such a way as to "result in decisions which are theoretically, as well as constitu-
tionally, infirm." Id. at 257.
See alsoJoEllen S. McComb, Unavailability and Admissibility: Are a Child's Out-of-Court
Statements About Sexual Abuse Admissible if the Child Does Not Testify at Trial?, 76 Ky. L. J.
531 (1980). "[C]ommentators complain that reliance on spontaneity, and lapse of time
between the event and the statements limit the usefulness" of the excited utterance
exception. Id. at 556-57. In regard to the medical diagnosis exception, McComb states
that "statements of children that are admitted under the medical diagnosis or treat-
ment exception are sometimes seen as 'torturing' the exception by stretching it 'be-
yond its intended scope.' " Id. at 558.
182. See WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 86-89, app. at 167; see supra note 59 and accom-
panying text.
183. The rule provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition" is not inadmissible as hearsay. MINN. R. EviD. 803(2).
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prompted the statement. 184 Because of the emphasis on the emo-
tional affect of the declarant, Rule 803(2) works most effectively when
the child witness's statement was made shortly after a specific abuse
incident or where an abuse incident was interrupted by a third party.
1. The Requirements of Rule 803(2) of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence
A statement falls within Rule 803(2) only when the declarant is
"under the aura of excitement" from the event.185 The victim is under
the "aura of excitement" when (1) there was a startling event or condi-
tion; (2) the statement is reflective of that startling event or condition;
and (3) the statement was made under the stress caused by the event
or condition.1 86 This exception is premised on the belief that a state-
ment made under the stress of a startling event is more reliable than a
statement made after the stress of the event has passed. A declarant
who is excited is presumed to lack the capacity to fabricate the state-
ment or to reflect upon the consequences of the statement.1 8 7 Given
these circumstances, the reliability and credibility of these statements
cannot be replicated in the "relative calm of the courtroom."
1 8 8
The circumstances surrounding the statement also play a critical
role in the admissibility of statements under this exception.1 8 9 The
most important factors to consider are the timing of the statement in
relation to the incident1 90 and the affect of the declarant. The deter-
mination of whether too much time has elapsed for the "aura of excite-
ment" to exist in the legal sense is largely dependant on the nature of
the incident. The more traumatic the incident, the greater the ex-
pected duration of the distress.1 9 1
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn. 1992) (citing MINN. R. EVID.
803(2) advisory committee comment) (quoted in State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 782
(Minn. 1986)).
The committee comment to Rule 803(2), adopted by Minnesota in Daniels, 380
N.W.2d at 782, suggests that the trial court should also consider "the length of the time
elapsed, the nature of the event, the physical condition of the declarant, [and] any possi-
ble motive to falsify." MINN. R. EVID. 803(2) committee comment.
187. White v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 736, 742-43 (1992); see also State v. Berry, 309 N.W.2d
777, 783 (Minn. 1981) (finding statement admissible as long as the declarant did not
have an opportunity to calm down and reflect on the statement).
188. White, 112 S.Ct. at 743.
189. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d at 783 n.7.
190. See id. at 783. But see Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has it Been Abol-
ishedDeFacto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 494 (1992) (suggesting a new test
which focuses on the time between "the 'first real opportunity' to report the events"
and the report, and not on the time between the event and the statement).
191. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
803(2) [01], at 803-34 (1993).
1994]
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2. Specific Problems Wen Rule 803(2) is Used in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases
The use of Rule 803(2) in child sexual abuse cases can raise poten-
tial problems. Specific concerns include the amount of time that has
elapsed between the abuse incident and the statement, the affect of
the child declarant, and the accuracy of the child's statements. The
focus on the time that has elapsed between the event and the state-
ment may pose the most significant barrier to the use of the excited
utterance exception in child sexual abuse cases. There can be little
doubt that the abuse itself was a startling event. However, child sexual
abuse can occur over a significant period of time before it is discovered
or before the child makes a disclosure. 192 Although, under the excited
utterance exception, appellate courts appear willing to accept state-
ments made anywhere from one minute 193 to ninety minutes194 after
the incident, critical statements may still be excluded.1 95 In many situ-
ations, the child does not report the abuse until days or weeks after the
incident.1 9 6 In cases of long-term abuse, the victimization may be dis-
covered only through behavioral changesI 9 7 or though small disclo-
sures by the child over an extended period of time.198 In these
situations, Rule 803(2) would arguably not apply because too much
time has probably elapsed between the abuse incident and the child's
statement.
192. Disclosure is often delayed because of confusion, shame, guilt, and fear. State
v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984).
193. State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn. 1992).
194. State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1985); see also Edwards, 485
N.W.2d at 915 (implying that a statement made one hour after the incident may also be
an excited utterance); WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that some states allow
statements under this exception weeks or months after the abuse, depending on the
reason for the delay).
195. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.30, at 167 (noting that
some courts are adopting a more liberal approach on the time element of the excited
utterance exception in child abuse cases).
196. State v. Quinnild, 231 Minn. 99, 107-08, 42 N.W.2d 409, 413-14 (1950) (finding
no excited utterance where during the intervening hour and a half to two hours, the
victim did not say anything when he returned, took a shower, thought about the abuse,
and slept).
197. See State v. Struss, 404 N.W.2d 811, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that the
abuse was revealed by the victim's reluctance to stay with the defendant and a deteriora-
tion in the victim's behavior), review denied, (Minn. June 9, 1987); WHrrCoMB, supra note
1, at 88.
198. WHrrcoMB, supra note 1, at 23. Children often make a partial disclosure to test
reaction to the disclosure. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 9 at 134. Disclosure over
time may also result where the abuse has been repressed and the child does not reveal it
until he or she is able to put the pieces together. See also State v. Garden, 404 N.W.2d
912,916 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on the testimony of two psychologists, the court
noted that victims often reveal more details over time as they build confidence and as
they feel they are being supported), review denied, (Minn. June 25, 1987).
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One way to alleviate this problem is to focus not on the time be-
tween the event and the statement, but on the time between "the 'first
real opportunity' to report the events" and the statement.1 99 Some
courts have impliedly adopted this theory by allowing statements to be
admitted weeks or months after the abuse, depending on the reason
for the delay in reporting.20 0 In cases of delayed reporting, however,
admitting a statement as an excited utterance theoretically detracts
from the inherent reliability assigned to these statements because the
passage of time allows for allegations of fabrication. In these situa-
tions, it may be more appropriate to admit the statement under an-
other rule of evidence.
Rule 803(2) poses an additional problem with its emphasis on the
affect of the declarant. Generally, the declarant must display some
traditional sign of distress.20 1 For example, if the child was crying hys-
terically or was visibly frightened when the statement was made, and if
the statement was made close in time to the incident, the statement
probably falls within Rule 803(2).202 This specific reaction, however,
may not exist in all children. Children sometimes do not understand
that the abuse is wrong and may in fact consider it to be normal, thus
inhibiting "normal" signs of distress. 203 Additionally, if a child is se-
verely traumatized, or if the abuse has extended over a long period of
time, the child may make the statement in a detached or unemotional
manner.204
Arguably, Rule 803(2) should still apply because an unemotional re-
action may itself be a manifestation of distress. Furthermore, the reac-
tion of a child should be analyzed in terms of a child's, rather than an
199. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.30, at 170-71; Swift, supra
note 190, at 494; see also State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Minn. 1986) (noting
that time may not always be determinative).
200. WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 87.
201. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.30, 172-79. Myers lists
several factors courts have considered to determine whether the child was under the
excitement of the event when a statement was made. These include the child's emo-
tional and physical condition, whether the child was crying, whether the child has slept
between the startling event and the statement, the content of the statement, the child's
speech pattern, the child's lack of recall, the age of the child, the nature of the event
described, the intelligence of the child, the questioning of the child, and corroborative
evidence of the event described. Id.
202. State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 784 (Minn. 1986); see also United States v.
Ironshell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981). Ironshell
indicated that courts should consider "the age of the declarant, the physical and mental
condition of the declarant, the characteristics of the event and the subject matter of the
events." Id.
203. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.29, at 161; WHITCOMB,
supra note 1, at 88; Cynthia J. Hennings, Comment, Accomodating Child Abuse Victims:
Special Hearsay Exceptions in Sexual Offense Prosecutions, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 663, 667
(1989).
204. Myers, Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 118.
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adult's, emotional reaction. An abused child's emotional reaction
should be evaluated in light of what that child experienced to deter-
mine whether the aura of excitement still exists.
Another problem with the use of Rule 803(2) in child sexual abuse
cases are the challenges to the accuracy of the child's out-of-court state-
ment. Rule 803(2) relies on the declarant's state of distress to establish
reliability. Critics argue that the declarant's excitement or distress in
fact makes the statement less accurate because the declarant's emo-
tions detract from the factual accuracy of the statement.2 05 In cases of
child sexual abuse, however, the facts contained in the child's state-
ments are not likely to be overly compact. Statements made close in
time to an abuse incident are likely to contain only a very simple de-
scription of the incident and perhaps the name of the perpetrator. 206
Such statements rarely contain an abundance of factual information,
making it difficult to seriously challenge the accuracy of these state-
ments. Even if these statements do contain a lot of factual informa-
tion, that does not mean the statement is unreliable. The content of
that information can be compared with the age of the child to see if
the child would ordinarily know that kind of information. The content
of the statement can also be compared with the circumstances sur-
rounding the abuse, such as the alleged perpetrator's access to the
child, to test the reliability of the statement.
3. The Advantages of Using Rule 803(2)
Under Rule 803(2), the content of the statement must only relate to
the startling incident. Consequently, the child's identification of the
perpetrator, 207 the description of the abuse, and any other matters re-
lating to the abuse are admissible as excited utterances. 2 08 Valuable
factual information, therefore, can be admitted as evidence under
Rule 803(2).
It is important to note that questioning the child during the mo-
ment of excitement does not, in and of itself, destroy the applicability
of Rule 803(2).209 Asking non-suggestive questions or clarifying ques-
tions in response to the child's exclamation does not destroy the pre-
sumption that the excitement interferes with the child's capacity to
fabricate.210 Attention, however, must still be paid to the content of
205. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 191, 1 803(2) [01], at 803-86.
206. The exclamation, "Daddy put his wee-wee in my pee-pee!" is one such example.
207. See infra notes 220-246 and accompanying text (discussing the debate about
whether identity is admissible when the statement was made for the purpose of medical
treatment or diagnosis).
208. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 191, at 803-35.
209. United States v. Ironshell, 633 F.2d 77, 85 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Minn. 1986); see also In re Welfare of
Chuesburg, 305 Minn. 543, 546, 233 N.W.2d 887, 889 (1975).
210. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.30, at 178.
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the questions put to the child, especially where leading or suggestive
questions were used. If the central tenet of Rule 803(2) is the lack of
opportunity to fabricate, leading or suggestive questions may, in fact,
do much to destroy this presumption.2 11 While the statement may still
be admissible under another exception, the use of leading questions
may remove a particular statement from the protective parameters of
Rule 803(2).
Although there are some problems with the use of Rule 803(2) in
child abuse cases, this exception can still be helpful. It is highly appli-
cable where the abuse is still discovered shortly after the incident. If a
significant amount of time has passed between the abuse and the dis-
closure, other rules of evidence provide an alternative for getting the
child's out-of-court statements admitted as evidence. Turning to other
rules of evidence also avoids an incorrect application of the principles
underlying the excited utterance exception.
B. Rule 803(4) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence: Statements for the
Purposes of Medical Treatment or Diagnosis
The second traditional hearsay exception applicable in child sexual
abuse cases is Rule 803(4) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, the
medical statements exception.212 Statements made to physicians and
psychologists for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment are admissible
under Rule 803(4). The applicability of Rule 803(4) in child abuse
cases is often questioned because of the age of the child victim or the
nature of the examination. These objections, however, overlook the
original intent and theories behind the exception. The child's state-
ments to a physician or psychologist should be admitted under Rule
803(4) when the child sees a physician or psychologist for treatment of
the injuries resulting from the abuse or when the child is evaluated to
determine if the abuse in fact occurred.
211. See id. at 179; State v. Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 527, 40 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1949).
Gorman noted that a statement "made in response to a question may be less indicative of
spontaneity than an uninvited one." Id. (quoting Meyer v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 130 Minn.
242, 244, 153 N.W. 523, 524 (1915)). The court in Gorman, however, concluded that
the statement was admissible under Rule 803(2) because the statement did not contain
any of the question's suggested facts. Id.
212. The Rule 803(4) exception provides for the admission of
[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
MINN. R. EvID. 803(4).
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1. The Requirements of Rule 803(4) of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence
Statements made for either diagnostic or treatment purposes are ad-
missible under Rule 803(4).213 The inherent reliability of Rule 803(4)
statements is premised on the "selfish-motive doctrine."214 The "self-
ish-motive doctrine" presumes that patients have a strong motivation
to tell the truth when describing their symptoms or the cause of their
injury because treatment and diagnosis often depends on what the pa-
tient tells the doctor.215 Given these circumstances, the reliability of
the statements cannot be replicated in the courtroom.
A statement relates to the patient's treatment or diagnosis if it is the
kind of statement traditionally relied on by members of that profession
to make medical decisions. 216 It is sufficient that the physician or psy-
chologist bases part of the medical findings or conclusions on the pa-
tient's statement.2 17 This aspect of Rule 803(4) represents an attempt
to make the rule consistent with the physician's ability to state the basis
for an expert opinion at trial, even if the facts upon which the physi-
cian relied are not admissible as evidence.218 As with an adult, the
physician must question the child to determine which types of physical
injuries may be present.2 19 Physicians often make final diagnoses
based on a combination of the information learned from the child vic-
tim and from a physical examination.220 As long as the statement was
reasonably directed toward treatment or diagnosis, the statement
should be admitted under Rule 803(4).
213. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 191, 803(4) [01], at 803-146.
214. Id. at 803-144 (noting that the patient has a "motive to disclose the truth be-
cause his treatment will in part depend upon what he says."(quoting Meaney v. United
States, 112 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1940)).
215. Id.
216. MINN. R. EVID. 803(4) committee comment.
217. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 191, at 803-147 to 803-149. In United States v.
Iron Shell 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981), the court
noted that a two part test could be applied in a Rule 803(4) analysis. The first question
is whether "the declarant's motive is consistent with the purpose of the rule; and sec-
ond, is it reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treat-
ment." Id. at 84.
218. See MINN. R. EVID. 703; MINN. R. EVID. 803(4) committee comment.
219. See United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
argument that Rule 803(4) can only be used "if the doctor has no alternative source for
the information other than direct questioning of the patient"); Iron Shell 633 F.2d at 84
(noting that "[d]iscovering what is not injured is equally as pertinent to treatment and
diagnosis as finding what is injured"); State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting that preliminary questions by the physician were admissible as med-
ical history pertinent to treatment).
220. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 312.
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2. Popular Arguments and Rebuttals to Using Rule 803(4) in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases
The use of Rule 803(4) in child sexual abuse prosecutions has been
the subject of several challenges. Those opposing the use of the rule
argue that young children do not know who a doctor is or what pur-
pose the doctor serves; that statements made to psychologists, social
workers, or doctors specialzing in the child abuse area do not fall
under Rule 803(4); and that the identification of the perpetrator does
not fall under Rule 803(4).
The child's presumed lack of understanding about physicians and
medical care is the most recent challenge to the use of Rule 803(4) in
child sexual abuse cases. Opponents argue that young children do not
know who a doctor is or what purpose the doctor serves. If this were
the case, then the underlying premise of the rule would be defeated
because the child would not have a selfish motive to tell the truth.
However, even young children can have an understanding of what doc-
tors do.221
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this argument in
Ring v. Erickson.222 A Minnesota trial court had admitted the three-
year-old child's statements to an examining physician under Rule
803(4).223 Reversing the conviction, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
Rule 803(4) did not apply because the record did not reflect that the
child knew she was speaking to a doctor.224 The court held that Rule
803(4) could be used only where the child's testimony, or the testi-
mony of an adult, establishes that the child had this knowledge.225
The holding in Ring seemingly contradicts the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in White v. Illinois.226 In White, the trial court
221. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.36, at 221 (noting that
the question of whether the child understands he or she is speaking with a doctor varies
with the developmental age of the child and varies among individual children).
222. 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1993).
223. Id. at 819, 820 n.1.
224. Id. at 820 n.1. Contra Dana v. Dep't. of Corrections, 958 F.2d 237, 239 (8th Cir.
1992) (concluding that because the four-year-old child's statements fell within Rule
803(4) reliability could be inferred), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3043 (1992).
225. Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d at 820 n.2. But see State v. Lonergan, 505 N.W.2d 349,
354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding the child's age of nine, without more, was suffi-
cient to establish that he was old enough to have a motive to tell the truth so he could
be treated properly).
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's arguments, Myers argues that even if the child
did not understand the importance of being truthful with the person with whom he or
she was talking, the statement may still be the type ordinarily relied upon by doctors to
provide treatment. MYERs, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.36, at 218. In
these cases, Myers argues that each rationale provides independent basis for admissibil-
ity and the statement can still be admitted under Rule 803(4), even if only one rationale
is present. Id. at 218-19.
226. 112 S.Ct. 736 (1992).
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admitted a four-year-old child's statement to a doctor and nurse under
Rule 803(4) of the Illinois Rules of Evidence.227 The Court, affirming
the admission of the statement, noted that the reliability of statements
made to medical doctors cannot be duplicated by live in-court testi-
mony.228 The Court did not require a specific predicate finding that
the child knew she was speaking to a doctor.
Even assuming that such a finding is required, this is not a substan-
tial barrier to the use of Rule 803(4). A simple question to the child or
parent about whether the child understands who a doctor is eliminates
this challenge. Challenges can also be defeated by asking physicians
and psychologists, either while testifying or during the preliminary
hearing, whether they told the child who they are and why the child
was being examined or evaluated.229 The answer to this question will
help the court determine whether or not the child's out-of-court state-
ment should be admitted under Rule 803(4). The mere age of the
child, without more, should not raise a presumption that the child did
not understand who the doctor was or why the child was seeing the
doctor or psychologist.
A second frequent challenge is whether statements to psychologists
and social workers fall within the parameters of Rule 803(4). Oppo-
nents argue that the admission of a child's statements to these profes-
sionals contradicts the assurances of reliability provided by Rule
803(4).230 An examination of the purpose of the rule and the special
nature of child sexual abuse reveals the weakness of this argument.
The medical statements exception was never intended to be limited
to statements made to physicians.2 31 In fact, statements made to ambu-
lance drivers, hospital attendants, and even family members were con-
templated as falling within the parameters of Rule 803(4).232 Further,
a child's statements to psychologists and social workers are very critical
because they help establish the course of psychological treatment or
diagnosis. 23s A sexually abused child's treatment does not end with
the diagnosis or treatment of the physical manifestations of abuse. 23 4
227. Id. at 740. The child was called as a witness but she was unable to respond to
any questions because of "emotional difficulties." Id. at 739.
228. Id. at 743.
229. See MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.36, at 223.
230. See, e.g., WHrrcoMB, supra note 1, at 86-7.
231. MINN. R EVID. 803(4) committee comment.
232. Id.
233. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 191,1 803(4) [01], at803-150 (noting that Rule
803(4) does not specifically reject applicability to statements made to psychologists).
234. See United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). Renville held that a
"physician must be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological injuries which
accompany [sexual abuse]." Id. at 437; cf United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 757
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Therapy is often crucial to help the child deal with, and recover from,
the emotional impact of the sexual abuse. Therapy is often the only
treatment a physician can suggest, as the physical manifestations of the
abuse may not need treatment or may have already healed.235 Admit-
ting into evidence the statements made by a child to a psychologist or
social worker for purposes of treatment is consistent with the intent of
Rule 803(4) that statements made during the course of treatment
should be admitted over hearsay objections. Narrowly interpreting the
rule to exclude psychologists and social workers is inconsistent with
that intent.
Similarly, opponents argue that the child is not being treated or di-
agnosed when seen by a physician or psychologist who specializes in
the area of child abuse. 23 6 In these situations, it has been argued that
the child is being examined solely for litigation purposes and not for
the purposes of treatment or diagnosis. 2S7 Somehow, opponents of
the use of Rule 803(4) in child abuse cases presume that a suspicion of
abuse removes the diagnosis aspect of the child's visit to a specialist.
Again, this argument finds no support in the history or intent of
Rule 803(4). The basic tenet of Rule 803(4) is that the statement must
be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment" before it is admis-
sible.238 Moreover, Rule 803(4) makes no distinction between treating
and nontreating physicians. Therefore, the rule not only applies
where a physician treats the child, but also where an expert physician
makes a diagnosis.239 The theoretical framework supporting the use
of statements made for diagnostic purposes existed at the adoption of
the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. These same theoretical underpin-
nings should apply in child abuse cases just as they do in other cases.
Consequently, arguments to exclude a child's statement to an expert
who specializes in child sexual abuse are groundless.
The argument that Rule 803(4) should not cover statements made
to physicians or psychologists who specialize in the child abuse area is
also defeated by looking at the reason why such an evaluation is neces-
sary. In some child sexual abuse cases, unlike most personal injury
235. United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1992) (doctor conducting
the initial examination was unable to find any evidence of sexual abuse).
236. United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 787 (8th Cir. 1993).
237. Id.; see also State v. Thompson, 820 P.2d 335, 339-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
238. MINN. R. EvID. 803(4) committee comment.
239. See MYERs, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.35, at 217 (noting that
the experience of the professional who examines the child increases the reliability of
the child's statements because of the professional's understanding of the importance of
her evaluation); Whitted, 11 F.3d at 787 (citing United States v. Iron Thunder, 714 F.2d
765, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1983))(noting that "Rule 803(4) applies to statements made for
the sole purpose of diagnosis, which includes statements made to a doctor who is con-
sulted only to testify as an expert witness"); State v. Lonergan, 505 N.W.2d 349, 354
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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cases, only an expert may be able to determine whether sexual abuse
did occur or whether the injuries of the child are consistent with the
type of abuse that has been alleged. 24o Because of the special nature of
sexual abuse, an examination and diagnosis by a specialist or expert
may be crucial to establishing an essential element of the charged
offense.2
4 1
Perhaps one of the most contested issues is whether a child's state-
ment identifying the perpetrator is reasonably related to the medical
diagnosis and treatment to allow admission under Rule 803(4). Gener-
ally, statements of causation are admissible while statements of fault
are not admissible.242 The standard example is that a patient's state-
ment that he was struck by an automobile would be admissible, but a
statement that the car was driven through a red light would not be
admissible. 2 43
By analogy, a child's statement alleging genital penetration would be
admissible but a statement that "Daddy did it" or "Mommy did it"
would not be admissible. At a superficial level, this conclusion appears
to be correct. The relevance of the statements of fault in these two
situations is, however, vastly different. The fact that a car went through
240. See State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 657 (Minn. 1990) (scarring on child's
hymen and an enlarged vaginal opening were the only physical signs of abuse), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 693 (1991); State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (rejecting the argument that an allegation of sexual abuse does not warrant a
physical examination because it presumes there was no physical injury), review denied,
(Minn. Apr. 24, 1986).
These same arguments support the need for an assessment by a psychologist with
experience in working with abused children. Cf Whitted, 11 F.3d at 787 (contrasting the
ability of a nurse, who had never seen a sexually abused child, to give psychological
opinions, with a physician, who had attended many sexual abuse workshops and treated
many sexually abused children).
241. See United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1992). The facts of Balfany
illustrate the importance of a suspected abuse victim being examined by a physician
with both training and experience in detecting sexual abuse. The child in Batfany was
initially examined by a general practitioner after her aunt suspected abuse. Id. at 578.
No physical signs of sexual abuse were discovered. Id. The child later reported the
abuse to a teacher and she was again examined, this time by a doctor with both training
and experience in diagnosing sexual abuse. Id. At trial, the physician testified that he
had observed a significant rounding of the hymen and a healed tear on the hymen. Id.
at 578-79. The physician suggested that the first doctor missed these indicators of abuse
because he did not have the training and experience necessary to differentiate a normal
hymen from an abnormal one. Id. at 579. The experienced physician also attributed
the first doctor's failure to see these indicators of abuse to the fact that a culdoscopy was
not used in the examination. Id. A culdoscopy enables a doctor to fully examine the
genital area. Id. at 578 n.2. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the admission of the child's
statements to the doctor, rejecting the argument that the examination was conducted
only for the purposes of litigation. Id. at 579-80. Without an examination by a special-
ist, the sexual abuse would most likely have gone undetected.
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a red light has no impact upon the treatment of broken bones and
lacerations. In contrast, identifying the perpetrator may be crucial to
help ensure the future safety of the child. The treatment of sexual
abuse may include removing the child from the home or at least ensur-
ing that the child has no contact with the alleged perpetrator.2 44 The
child's treatment, whether physical or psychological, has no meaning if
the child is treated only to return home to, or within the reach of, the
perpetrator. 24 5 For these reasons, a physician, psychologist, or social
worker should be allowed to testify about the child's identification of
the perpetrator under Rule 803(4).246
As the above theories and arguments indicate, Rule 803(4) does ap-
ply in child sexual abuse cases. It should apply when the child makes a
statement to a doctor while either receiving treatment or being diag-
nosed for possible abuse. Similarly, statements made to a psychologist
should also be admitted under Rule 803(4) because psychological
treatment can be a necessary part of the treatment of a child abuse
victim. The theories and reasoning behind Rule 803(4) apply equally
in cases of child sexual abuse as in cases involving adults and should be
relied upon to admit children's statements. If, however, the theories
and reasoning behind Rule 803(4) cannot logically be applied to a par-
ticular case, the other rules of evidence should be used.247
244. Importantly, physicians, social workers and psychologists are required to report
any suspected cases of child abuse. MINN. STAT. § 626.556, subd. 3 (1992).
245. See United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 608 (8th Cir. 1987) ("statements of fault
made to a physician by a child who has been sexually abused by a household member
are admissible under Rule 803(4)"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988); United States v.
Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436-37 (8th Cir. 1985) ("Information that the abuser is a mem-
ber of the household is therefore 'reasonably pertinent' to a course of treatment... ");
Swift, supra note 190, at 496-97. The identity of the perpetrator is also crucial where the
child is diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease. WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 86.
246. It is interesting to note that in White v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 736 (1992), the Court
upheld the admission of a four-year-old's statements under Rule 803(4). Id. at 739-40.
These statements identified the perpetrator who was only a friend of the child's mother
and was not staying at the house. Id. at 739.
The physician, psychologist, or social worker should be permitted to testify about
the alleged perpetrator's identity whenever the alleged perpetrator is a parent, a family
member living near or having frequent contact with the child, a parent's significant
other, or a child care provider. Although the identification of a person not falling
within this group should also be admitted under Rule 803(4) because the statement was
reasonably related to treatment, it is more likely that a challenge to the admission of the
child's statement will be successful in this case.
247. For example, if the examination occurred within a relatively short period of
time after the abuse, the statement may be more properly offered under Rule 803(2).
A statement that identifies the perpetrator is admissible under Rule 803(2) because the
rule only requires that the statement relate to the startling event. See supra notes 185-
211 and accompanying text.
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C. Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence: The
Residual Rules of Evidence
Many of the statements made by abused children containing vital
factual information about the nature of the abuse and the identity of
the perpetrator fall within Rule 803(2) and 803(4). However, a child's
statements to family members, teachers, or friends may also contain
significant factual information. These statements and their attendant
circumstances may be the only evidence that the abuse actually
occurred.
At present, there are three alternative means of getting these types
of statements admitted as substantive evidence. These three means are
Rules 803(24) and 804(b) (5) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence (the
residual exceptions), and the Minnesota child hearsay statute. The
residual exceptions may apply to any statement that does not fall
within the firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions. The five requirements of
the residual exceptions must, however, be met before the out-of-court
statements can be admitted as substantive evidence.
The purposes of the residual exceptions and the child hearsay stat-
ute are similar in that they all were designed to apply in those cases
where the traditional hearsay exceptions do not apply. 248 Although
the residual exceptions and the child hearsay statute have the same
purpose, their requirements are not identical. Yet, the courts have
seemingly merged the analysis under the residual rules with the analy-
sis under the child hearsay statute, creating a quasi-residual hearsay
exception.249
To alleviate this common law merger of the rules of evidence with a
statutory rule, a new rule of evidence should emerge. Prior to discuss-
ing this new rule, however, the requirements of Rules 803(24) and
804(b) (5) must be reviewed.
1. The Requirements of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions
Both Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) have five requirements. 250
The only difference between the two rules is that Rule 804(b) (5) re-
248. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1992); MINN. R EviD. 803(24); MINN. R. EVID.
804(b) (5).
249. Cf MYERrS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.43, at 249 (noting that
"child hearsay exceptions are simply residual exceptions for children's out-of-court
statements").
250. MINN. R. EviD. 803(24) and MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) both provide:
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court de-
termines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a state-
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quires that the declarant be unavailable to testify, whereas the declar-
ant's availability is irrelevant under Rule 803(24).251 Though the
analysis under each is virtually identical, the availability or unavailabil-
ity of the declarant will determine which of the two rules should be
used in a particular case.
Both of the residual hearsay exceptions require that the child's out-
of-court statement contain circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.252 Minnesota courts have relied exclusively upon the Idaho v.
Wright analysis to determine reliability.2 53 They have also relied upon
Idaho v. Wright's prohibition of the use of corroborative evidence to
establish reliability, even though the residual exceptions themselves do
not contain such a prohibition. 254 The factors frequently relied on
include the spontaneity of the statements, consistent repetition, the
use of nonleading questions, sexual knowledge inconsistent with the
child's age, the interviewer's preconception of what the child should
reveal, and the motivation of either the person hearing the statement
or the child to fabricate.255 Reliability under Rules 803(24) and
804(b) (5) is, therefore, determined only from the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement. 256
The second requirement of the residual rules is that the statement
must provide evidence of a material fact.257 This requirement simply
reiterates the general rule that evidence must be relevant to be admis-
sible.258 The materiality of children's out-of-court statements is readily
apparent because these statements generally describe the abuse or
ment may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hear-
ing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
[the proponent's] intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name, address, and present whereabouts of the declarant.
Id.
251. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5); MYERs, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABusE, supra
note 33, § 7.42, at 242.
252. See MINN. R EVIn. 803(24), 804(b) (5).
253. See supra notes 146-69 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 122-37 and accompanying text. The initial cases interpreting
the statute recognized that the factors indicating reliability for the child hearsay statute
are the same as those used for the residual hearsay exceptions. See State v. Bellotti, 383
N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986); State v.
Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); see also Graham, supra note 35, at
534-35.
255. State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033
(1991).
256. Some courts have indicated that as the trustworthiness of the statement in-
creases, the reasons for excluding it decrease. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d
601, 609 n.9 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988).
257. MINN. R. EVID. 803(24)(A), 804(b)(5)(A).
258. See McCoRmIcK, supra note 31, § 184, at 338.
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identity of the perpetrator. Both the nature of the abuse and the iden-
tity of the perpetrator are material elements of sexual abuse.259
The residual hearsay rules also require that the out-of-court state-
ment be more probative than any other evidence the proponent could
reasonably produce.2 60 Discussion of this factor is noticeably absent
from appellate decisions, as is discussion about the second require-
ment of the residual hearsay rules.261 This lack of discussion may dis-
courage the use of the residual exceptions because of a fear that the
probative value of the statements cannot outweigh the potential
prejudice.
Probative value can be easily established. Statements that best
demonstrate an element of the offense are the most probative evi-
dence of that specific element.262 Probative value can also exist if the
out-of-court statement's context and content cannot be reproduced in
the courtroom. 263 Although some of the statements may be cumula-
tive, they may help the jury to evaluate other evidence which would
establish the probative value of the statements. 2
64
259. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342-.345 (1992 & Supp. 1993). In addition to
prohibiting sexual penetration or contact by force or coercion, these sections proscribe
either sexual penetration or contact when certain age disparities, a significant relation-
ship, or a relationship of authority exists between the victim and the perpetrator.
260. MINN. R. EVID. 803(24) (B), 804(b) (5) (B).
261. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608, 618-19 (Minn. 1993); State v. Edwards,
485 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. 1992).
262. The probative value requirement requires only that it be the most probative
evidence "on the point for which it is offered," not that it be the most probative evidence
of the crime itself. See MINN. R. Evm. 803(24) (B), 804(b) (5) (B) (emphasis added).
263. See United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1068 (1988). In Shaw, the out-of-court statements of the child who testified were the
most probative evidence because these statements were the first known statements
made by the child, were made very shortly after the abuse, and contained specific dates.
Id. at 610. Accord People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1343 (I1. App. Ct. 1989) (noting
that a child's earlier statement is "the kind of irreplaceable substantive evidence that
might be more probative than in-court testimony"), appeal denied, 553 N.E.2d 400 (Ill.
Apr. 4, 1990); State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985) (recognizing the "poten-
tially superior trustworthiness" of hearsay statements as compared to in-court testi-
mony); Jones v. State, 781 P.2d 326, 329 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (rejecting the
argument that statements were cumulative because each statement not only described
the circumstances under which the abuse was discovered, but also described the nature
of the abuse); Cf White v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743 (1992) (noting that out-of-court
statements may have substantial probative value that could not be duplicated by the
declarant later testifying in court).
264. WEINSrEIN & BERGER, supra note 191, 803(24) [01], at 803-379 (1985).
Even if the child does fully testify, the statements may be admissible to corroborate
the child's testimony. MINN. R. EvID. 801(d) (1) (B). SeeState v. Dana, 422 N.W.2d 246,
248 n.1 (Minn. 1988) (admitting child's out-of-court statements as corroborative evi-
dence even if they were not admissible under the child hearsay statute), habeas corpus
denied, 958 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3043 (1992); see also State v.
Kruse, 302 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Minn. 1981) (affirming the admission of the details of the
victim's complaint as corroboration); State v. Arndt, 285 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1979)
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Moreover, the probative value of out-of-court statements signifi-
cantly increases when the child is unavailable to testify. Rule
804(b) (5) specifically provides for the admission of statements where
the declarant is unavailable. 2 65 In fact, the advisory committee for the
rules of evidence anticipated greater use of Rule 804(b) (5) than Rule
803(24)266 because the declarant's unavailability significantly increases
the need for the out-of-court statements. 2 6 7 If the child victim is un-
available, then strong probative value lies in the lack of any other evi-
dence to establish the content of what the child's testimony would have
been.268
The fourth requirement of the residual exceptions is that the state-
ment's admission must be consistent with the rules of evidence and the
interests of justice.2 69 Commentators indicate that this requirement
has no appreciable effect on the admissibility of a statement because
the requirement is rarely addressed by the courts when evaluating a
statement's admissibility.270
Finally, the residual rules require that the proponent of the state-
ment give sufficient notice of intent to use out-of-court statements so
the defendant has time to prepare.2 71 This requirement also has no
appreciable affect on the admissibility of a statement as it is a proce-
dural requirement rather than one requiring a detailed substantive
analysis.
X. AT AN EVIDENTIARY CROSSROADS: A TIME FOR CHANGE
The cases that have appeared before the Minnesota appellate courts
reflect a misinterpretation of the child hearsay statute by attorneys
seeking to admit a child's out-of-court statements. These cases consist-
ently involve the use of the Minnesota child hearsay statute where
other hearsay rules not only apply, but also provide an easier path to
admissibility. The evidentiary hearsay exceptions, grounded in years of
(holding that the out-of-court statement was not substantive evidence but rather corrob-
orative evidence); Graham, supra note 35, at 542. If the evidence is not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted and the declarant testifies under oath and is cross-ex-
amined, it is not considered hearsay and is admissible corroborative evidence. State v.
Hesse, 281 N.W.2d 491, 492 (Minn. 1979).
265. Rule 804 contains five definitions of unavailability. Three of these definitions
may apply in child sexual abuse cases: MINN. R. EVID. 804(a) (2) (refusal to testify);
MINN. R. EVID. 804(a) (3) ("lack of memory of the subject matter" of the out-of-court
statement); and MINN. R. EVID. 804(a) (4) (inability to testify because of existing mental
illness or infirmity).
266. MINN. R. EVID. 804(b) (5) committee comment.
267. Id.
268. See supra notes 262-263 and accompanying text.
269. MINN. R. EV. 803(24)(C), 804(b)(5)(C).
270. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, § 324, at 539.
271. MINN. . EvD. 803(24), 804(b) (5); MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(c) (1992).
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application and interpretation, are passed over in favor of the child
hearsay statute.
Despite the apparently widespread use of the child hearsay statute by
practitioners, the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly held that
the statute should not be relied upon when other rules of evidence
apply.2 72 This suggests that the supreme court will only look to the
child hearsay statute when none of the rules of evidence apply. Should
such a case present itself, however, it seems unlikely that the court
would use the child hearsay statute to uphold the admissibility of the
child's out-of-court statements because of the similarity between the
requirements of the child hearsay statute and the residual hearsay
exception.
Curiously, the decisions of the Minnesota Court of Appeals seem to
contradict the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. A few of the
court of appeals' decisions continue to apply the child hearsay statute
in cases where a residual hearsay exception clearly should have been
applied.2 73 Although these decisions result in the admission of chil-
dren's out-of-court statements, an inconsistent body of law has devel-
oped where the child hearsay statute and the residual hearsay
exceptions are being interchanged. This inconsistent body of law only
exacerbates the confusion over when the child hearsay statute should
be applied.
Aside from the problems of the child hearsay statute at a practical
level, the statute also represents overreaching by the legislature.
Although the child hearsay statute fulfilled a serious need at the time it
was enacted, the legislature lacked the authority to enact such a stat-
ute. Only the Minnesota Supreme Court has the authority under the
Separation of Powers Clause of the Minnesota Constitution to pro-
nounce rules of evidence.2 74 Where the legislature enacts statutory evi-
dentiary rules, the court will enforce the rules "as a matter of comity
where the rules [are] not in conflict with the Minnesota Rules of Evi-
dence."275 The court has taken this approach toward the child hearsay
statute. 27 6 Given the court's recent holding that the child hearsay stat-
272. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
273. See State v. Ligon, No. C4-92-2162, 1993 WL 405306 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12,
1993), review denied, (Minn. Dec. 14, 1993); State v. Goldstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 343-44
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (conducting the reliability analysis of Rule 803(24) but uphold-
ing admissibility under Rule 803(24)). See also supra note 149.
274. See MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1; State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn. 1983).
275. State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 29, aff'd on
remand, 472 N.W.2d 120 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 965 (1992); State v. Dana, 422
N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1988), habeas corpus denied, 958 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 3043 (1992); Wil/s, 332 N.W.2d at 184.
276. Larson, 453 N.W.2d at 46 n.3; Dana, 422 N.W.2d at 249.
Some states have found their version of the child hearsay statute to be unconstitu-
tional because of the Separation of Powers issue. The Arizona Supreme Court, in State
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ute should not be used where the rules of evidence apply,2 77 it is ques-
tionable whether the court will continue to follow this approach.
XI. THE RESOLUTION: A NEW CHILD HEARSAY RULE
One solution to the problems surrounding the Minnesota child
hearsay statute would be to simply abolish the statute. Courts have
constructively, if not actually, abandoned the use of a statutory analysis
under the child hearsay statute, using instead a quasi-residual hearsay
exception analysis. 2 78 The child hearsay statute was adopted only to
supplement the existing rules of evidence and statutes, not to super-
sede them. 279 Until recently, the supplemental nature of the statute
has been ignored by the courts.2 8 0 More significant, the child hearsay
statute is more stringent and less flexible than the firmly-rooted and
residual hearsay exceptions because of its age limitation and its re-
quirement of corroborative evidence when the child is unavailable to
testify.2 81
v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987), found that the statute's terms were contradictory,
contrary to the rules of evidence, and totally engulfing of the rules of evidence. Id. at
808. Further, the court held that it had exclusive power to promulgate evidentiary
rules. Id. at 807. Therefore, the legislature has only severely limited authority to enact
rules of evidence. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court found its child hearsay statute
facially unconstitutional because it encourages the use of corroborating factors to find
reliability in violation of Idaho v. Wright. George v. State, 813 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Ark.
1991). And finally, the Mississippi Supreme Court similarly found its child hearsay stat-
ute unconstitutional because only the Mississippi judiciary has the power to adopt rules
of evidence. Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1989).
277. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
279. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1992) (noting that it applies to statements "not
otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence").
Interestingly, the first child hearsay statutes were adopted because those states did
not have residual hearsay exceptions. Sheryl K. Peterson, Sexual Abuse of Children: Wash-
ington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REv. 813, 816 (1983); see also Stephanie A.
Wilson, Note, The Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 J.
Juv. L. 59, 61 (1984). As a result, firmly-rooted exceptions, like the excited utterance
exception, were being "tortured" to admit children's statements. State v. Myatt, 697
P.2d 836, 842 (Kan. 1985); Peterson, supra at 818. The child hearsay statutes in these
states eliminated this need because the statute directly addressed the admission of chil-
dren's out-of-court statements. Id. at 819. Minnesota, unlike these states, has residual
exceptions and therein lies the problem. See supra notes 250-271 and accompanying
text.
80. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
281. The child hearsay statute applies only to children under ten years of age and
requires a showing of corroborative evidence when the child is unavailable. MINN.
STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3(b) (ii) (1992). More importantly, it applies only when the other
rules of evidence do not apply. Id. This is unlike the traditional hearsay exceptions
which apply regardless of the applicability of the other rules. To properly use MINN.
STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3, the proponent of the statement must complete a thorough
analysis of all other possibly applicable rules of evidence before resorting to the child
hearsay statute. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
19941
47
Zehnder: A Step Forward: Rule 803(25), a New Approach to Child Hearsay Sta
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The presence of a child hearsay statute does, however, serve a valua-
ble purpose. It provides direct permission to the courts to admit the
out-of-court statements of child victims and prevents the reintrench-
ment of the belief that those statements are unreliable and inadmissi-
ble. The statute also provides specific guidelines for the admissibility
of out-of-court statements. 282 Its presence alone is a valuable reminder
that children's out-of-court statements are often admissible. However,
in light of the current interpretation and application of the child hear-
say statute, this reminder alone is insufficient to warrant the retention
of the statute in its present form.
To avoid total elimination of the statute, but to provide for consis-
tent and correct interpretation of the hearsay rules, Minnesota needs a
revised child hearsay rule. The new child hearsay exception should be
appended to the existing exceptions found in Rule 803 of the Minne-
sota Rules of Evidence. The inclusion of a new exception in Rule 803
would be appropriate for two reasons. First, it would resolve the sepa-
ration of powers problem that presently exists with the child hearsay
statute. Second, the new rule would set out an appropriate exception
to the general rule that out-of-court statements should not be admitted
into evidence. The out-of-court statements of child victims of sexual
abuse are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and, there-
fore, would appropriately be included with other similar hearsay ex-
ceptions. 28 3 Minnesota's current child hearsay statute should be
revised and adopted as Rule 803(25) of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence.284
A. Rule 803(25) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence: The Residual
Hearsay Exception For Child Abuse Cases
An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of eight-
een years or a person who is mentally impaired as defined in section
609.341, subdivision 6, alleging, explaining, denying, or describing
any act of sexual contact or penetration performed with or on the
child or mentally impaired person, any act of physical abuse of the
child or the person who is mentally impaired, any act of emotional
neglect or any act of neglect as defined by Minnesota Statutes Sec-
tion 609.378, or any statement by a child witnessing the foregoing, or
any statement of identification of the perpetrator of the foregoing
acts, not otherwise admissible under Rule 803(2) through (23) of
these rules of evidence is admissible as substantive evidence if:
282. See Note, Minnesota's Hearsay Exception for Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 11 WM.
MrrcHELL L. Rxv. 799, 811 (1985).
283. See MINN. R. EvD. 801(c).
284. For states which include the child hearsay statute within their rules of evidence,
see MICH. R. EvD. 803A; Miss. R. EVID. 803(25); N.J. R. EVID. 63(33); N.D. R. EVID.
803(24); OHIo R. EVID. 807; VT. R. Evm. 804a.
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(a) the court or person authorized to receive evidence holds an
evidentiary hearing prior to the admission of such statements,
outside the presence of the jury; and
(b) finds, upon the record, that the time, content, and circum-
stances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the
statement is made, excluding corroborative evidence, provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability; and
(c) the child or person who is mentally impaired either testifies at
the proceeding or is found to be unavailable as a witness; and
(d) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of
the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding at which
the proponent intends to offer the statement into evidence to pro-
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet the statement.
For purposes of this exception, an out-of-court statement includes
video, audio, or other recorded statements. An unavailable witness
includes an incompetent witness.
An unavailable witness includes children or persons who are men-
tally impaired and are unable to remember events in issue; unable to
understand the difference between truth and a lie when asked in
terms appropriate to the mental age of the child or the person who is
mentally impaired; unable to effectively communicate with the jury;
or unable to testify without suffering severe emotional trauma as sup-
ported by the testimony or affidavit of a mental health specialist.
285
B. The Advantages of Rule 803(25) Over the Minnesota Child Hearsay
Statute
This new rule of evidence would give the courts explicit permission
to admit children's out-of-court statements and would also provide
concrete guidelines for determining whether or not the statement is
admissible evidence. It would also eliminate some of the troubling as-
pects of the current child hearsay statute, while retaining many of its
fundamental elements. More important, Minnesota Rule of Evidence
803(25) would create a consistent body of law in the area of child hear-
say and would eliminate the use of a quasi-residual hearsay exception.
1. Rule 803(25) Expands the Class of Declarants
The first paragraph of Rule 803(25) tracks the language of the cur-
rent child hearsay statute while expanding the class to which the rule
would apply. The current child hearsay statute seems to reflect the
language of the old competency law in which children under the age
285. See People v. Newbrough, 803 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Colo. 1990) (using the child's
therapist to establish the psychological unavailability of the child); Altmeyer v. State,
496 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (using a psychiatrist to establish the fact
that testifying would be a severely traumatic experience for the child).
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of ten were presumed incompetent unless shown otherwise.286 By us-
ing this language, the legislature may have intended to counter the
outdated assumption that children under the age of ten could not be
trusted to tell the truth in court. Rule 803(25) would apply to all out-
of-court statements made by child abuse victims. The arbitrary line
created by the current child hearsay statute serves no valid purpose.
The need to admit a child's out-of-court statements does not necessar-
ily decrease just because the child has attained ten years of age.
Rule 803(25) also would be applicable in cases involving sexual
abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect.28 7 The need for
the child victim's out-of-court statements in emotional abuse and ne-
glect cases is as strong as it is in physical and sexual abuse cases. This is
especially true in cases involving emotional abuse, where there is typi-
cally no physical evidence. 288
Out-of-court statements made by children who witnessed sexual,
physical, or emotional abuse or neglect would also be included in Rule
803(25). In expressly providing that the statements made by those
child witnesses are admissible, the rule would eliminate the need to
rely solely on judicial interpretation. 289 In those rare cases where
other children have witnessed the abuse, it is essential to the successful
prosecution of the perpetrator that these children testify or that their
statements are admitted. This evidence enhances the prosecution's
case. Without this evidence, the case simply involves the child victim's
word against the alleged perpetrator's word.
2. Rule 803(25) Retains the Limited Applicability Provision
Rule 803(25) would retain the limiting provision found in the cur-
rent child hearsay statute. The other rules of evidence, excluding the
286. The current competency statute provides that children under the age of ten are
competent unless shown otherwise. See supra note 26.
287. There are five general categories of emotional neglect: 1) Rejecting-failure
to acknowledge the child's worth and emotional needs; 2) Isolating-prevention of
outside contacts and friendships; 3) Terrorizing-use of language to terrify and bully
the child so the child feels "the world is capricious and hostile;" 4) Ignoring-failure
to respond to the child or provide the stimulation necessary for emotional and intellec-
tual growth; and 5) Corrupting-teaching anti-social destructive and corrupting be-
havior. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 9, at 150 (quotingJAMEs GARBARINO ET AL., THE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY BATTERED CHILD 8 (1986)).
288. For child hearsay statutes that apply in cases involving crimes in addition to
physical or sexual abuse see: ALA. CODE §§ 15-25-31 to -39 (1982 & Supp. 1993) (entice-
ment of a child and pornography); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1987 & Supp. 1993)
(child prostitution); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1987 & Supp. 1993) (any other criminal
conduct committed with or upon the child); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1994)
(kidnapping and neglect); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983 & Supp. 1993) (endan-
gering welfare of a child); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 1994)
(solicitation of a child and sexual performance by a child).
289. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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residual exceptions, should still be used before Rule 803(25). Rule
803(25) would, therefore, still be a last resort. As the discussion on
Rule 803(2)290 and Rule 803(4)291 indicates, the analysis of whether a
child's out-of-court statement is admissible can be less strenuous under
these provisions than under the residual exceptions or the child hear-
say statute. The firmly-rooted exceptions also provide a more certain
basis for admitting the statement because those exceptions have been
used for a longer time period than either the child hearsay exception
or the residual hearsay exceptions.
Rule 803(25) would also eliminate the current competition between
the residual rules and the child hearsay statute.29 2 Those statements
which do not meet the requirements of the firmly-rooted exceptions
would be admissible under one single alternative exception. This
would result in one consistent body of law.
3. Rule 803(25) Rejects the Corroborative Evidence Requirement
One important advantage of Rule 803(25) over the current child
hearsay statute is that the rule would not require corroborative evi-
dence when the child is unavailable to testify. The corroborative evi-
dence requirement is simply an additional hurdle that could prevent a
child abuse case from being presented to a jury. This hurdle is not
required under either the firmly-rooted or residual hearsay excep-
tions. 29 3 According to the current child hearsay statute, the declar-
ant's age and availability are the determinate factors as to whether
there must be corroborative evidence before the child's out-of-court
statement can be admitted. The standards for the admissibility of a
child's out-of-court statement should not be higher simply because the
declarant is a child.294
290. See supra part VIII.A.
291. See supra part VIII.B.
292. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Accord State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d
801, 808 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that the Minor Sexual Victim Testimony Act unconstitu-
tionally infringes on the court's rule-making authority and that admissibility of child
hearsay statements should be determined under the rules of evidence). The Robinson
court also noted that the child hearsay statute was more restrictive because it required
sufficient indicia of reliability even when the child testifies. Id. See also State v. McCaf-
ferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D. 1984) (noting that the corroborative evidence require-
ment of South Dakota's child hearsay exception goes beyond the requirements of the
residual hearsay exception).
294. See United States v. Dunn, 851 F.2d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that "the
young age of the attesting witness should enhance the trustworthiness of the declara-
tions, not serve to undercut it"); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (8th
Cir. 1986) (noting that" 'a declarant's young age is a factor that may substantially lessen
the degree of skepticism with which we view [her] motives,' and mitigates in favor of
the trustworthiness and admissibility of her declarations") (quoting United States v.
Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 441 (8th Cir. 1985)).
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Corroborative evidence is sometimes lacking in child sexual abuse
cases. Sexual abuse is a private crime. The child and the perpetrator
are usually the only participants, so there often are no independant
witnesses. 295 Sexual abuse is also not typically a crime of physical vio-
lence. Physical evidence often is absent, especially in fondling cases.296
The difficulty of prosecuting child abuse cases should not be enhanced
by a requirement which adds little to the evaluation of the internal
reliability of the statements.
Few of the appellate cases in Minnesota have ever addressed the cor-
roborative evidence requirement on appeal. Some Minnesota appel-
late courts blatantly reject the requirement.2 97 Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court rejects the use of corroborative evidence to de-
termine the admissibility of out-of-court statements. 298 The Court's re-
jection indicates that the defendant's constitutional rights are not
violated when the child's out-of-court statement is admitted without a
requirement of corroborative evidence in addition to indicia of relia-
295. See supra note 55; see also State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985) (noting
that witnesses other than the victim and perpetrator are rare because people usually do
not molest children in front of others).
296. See Allan De Jong & Mimi Rose, Legal Proof of Child Sexual Abuse in the Absence of
Physical Evidence, 88 PEDIATRICS 506, 506 (1991) (study indicates that physical evidence
is often lacking in sexual abuse cases); MYERs, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 9, at 33.
Of the cases reviewed, only one case contained external physical evidence. In State
v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 837 (1990), the
child had small, healed scars on his rectum. Id. at 233. These are hardly the type of
injuries that would be noticed without a specific examination. Physical signs of the
abuse generally involve internal genital damage, visible only to physicians. See, e.g.,
United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 578-79 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding significant
rounding of the hymen and a healed tear on the hymen).
The corroborative evidence requirement may indirectly facilitate the perpetrator's
predation on young victims. Young children are sometimes unavailable to testify for a
variety of reasons. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31. If the state is required to
show corroboration, the statements may be inadmissible. The perpetrator may then
elude conviction and perhaps continue to victimize other young children. Accord State
v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that "[t]he legisla-
ture did not want to allow child abusers to escape conviction merely by choosing victims
who, due to their age or otherwise, are unavailable to testify at trial"), review denied,
(Minn. Apr. 24, 1986); People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 750 (Colo. 1989) (noting
that absent the admission of out-of-court statements, "molesters of small children, espe-
cially incestuous molesters, would rarely be punished") (quoting Nelson v. Farrey, 874
F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1989)).
297. See Dolny v. State, No. C5-91-23, 1991 WL 109230, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June
25, 1991); State v. Lovejoy, No. C8-90-880, 1991 WL 21614, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb.
26, 1991).
298. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-24 (1990). See also George v. State, 813
S.W.2d 792, 796 (Ark. 1991) (finding the Arkansas child hearsay statute "constitution-




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss3/7
NEW APPROACH TO CHILD HEARSAY
bility.299 The corroborative evidence requirement of the current child
hearsay statute can, therefore, be eliminated without violating the de-
fendant's constitutional rights.0o
Rule 803(25) would not prevent the admission of corroborative evi-
dence, if it exists, to avoid a conviction based solely on out-of-court
statements. Evidence that the defendant had access to or custody of
the child at the time of the abuse,301 the defendant's confession,02
and other corroborative evidence can be admitted for the jury's evalua-
tion. Corroborative evidence does allow the jury to evaluate the child's
statements outside of, and in light of, the facts contained in the state-
ment itself. It is important to note, however, that corroborative evi-
dence is not necessary for a conviction under Minnesota's criminal
sexual conduct statutes. 303 Corroborative evidence should only be
used to strengthen the case, not as a condition precedent to the admis-
sion of out-of-court statements.
XII. CONCLUSION
The admissibility of child hearsay statements is the subject of ongo-
ing debate and evolution. This issue will not disappear until child
abuse disappears. The law should accommodate prosecutions of per-
petrators of child abuse to the fullest extent it can within the limita-
tions of the Constitution. Such an accommodation was found in the
Minnesota child hearsay statute. This statute, though necessary and
299. Although it may not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, it may provide
an avenue for error. Judges, faced with corroborative evidence which is stronger than
the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, may be tempted to rely equally, if not
more so, on corroborative evidence to admit the statement. If the judge does so, the
conviction potentially can be reversed and result in a new trial. See Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. at 823; State v. Ring, No. C1-89-1038, 1990 WL 462, at *1-2 (finding that the de-
fendant's opportunity to commit the crime technically constitutes corroborative evi-
dence and remanding for a new trial), habeas corpus granted, 968 F.2d 760 (8th Cir.
1992), opinion vacated and superseded by, 983 F.2d 818 (1992). But see State v. Ligon, No.
C4-92-2162, 1993 WL 405306, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993) (noting that reliance
'on some improper factors does not, however, necessarily require exclusion of the
statement.").
300. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE, supra note 33, § 7.43, at 246 (noting that the
Idaho v. Wright court found that the "Sixth Amendment prohibits a court from consider-
ing corroborating evidence").
301. For cases using the defendant's opportunity to commit the crime to establish
reliability see State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied,
(Minn. Apr. 24, 1986) and State v. Ring, No. C1-89-1038, 1990 WL 462, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 1990), habeas corpus granted, 968 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1992), opinion vacated
and superseded by, 983 F.2d 818 (1992).
302. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 314.
303. See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subd. 1 (1992); see also State v. Hesse, 281 N.W.2d
491, 492 (Minn. 1979) (holding that corroborative evidence is not required to support
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beneficial at the time of enactment, no longer fulfills its original pur-
pose but serves to complicate the law on child hearsay. Enacting a new
hearsay rule would solve many of the problems and end the confusion
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